NON
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS): SYMPOSIUM
Symposium on issues confronting the world trading system —
Opening
remarks of Dean
Hirsch, International President of World Vision
6 and 7 July, World Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland
Thank you Madam Chair for the kind introduction and thank you
also to Mike Moore and the °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ Secretariat for the opportunity to
speak at the beginning of this two-day symposium on issues
confronting the world trading system.
I am not an economist or a trade expert. But I have worked on development issues for over two decades. I am privileged to serve as president of World Vision International, a relief and development organisation now working in nearly 100 countries.
Among our development work, for example, are irrigation and food security projects in Ethiopia, health centres in India, street children’s programs in Cambodia, and horticultural export projects in Brazil. We recognise, however, that alleviating poverty and suffering must occur at two levels: at the grassroots with the poor, and through international institutions, like the °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ, where the policymakers make the decisions that affect the poor. Therefore, our organisation also advocates on issues such as child rights, peace and conflict resolution, and trade and development.
I do not claim to speak on behalf of the world’s poor. I am not in their shoes. But I have spent a good deal of time with the poor. I have listened to their stories. I have seen their suffering and struggle. I have seen them work long and hard and still remain poor.
Over the past three decades, I have met with poor people in more than 100 developing countries. I have sat with mothers whose children were dying of hunger-related diseases because their governments lacked the capacity to deliver food and health care. I have met with small farmers whose livelihoods were destroyed first by drought and then by supposed relief grain unwisely dumped on the local market. I have talked with sidewalk vendors who saw most of their meagre daily earnings go on exorbitant loans which were their only source of credit. And I have seen the victims of hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and war – virtually all of them poor -- needlessly suffer for lack of infrastructure and resources.
I see these tragedies played out again and again in developing countries. They raise many questions about the way the world works and why the poor suffer first and suffer most.
So, at the beginning of a two-day symposium on issues confronting the world trading system, I would like to raise some questions, rather than try to provide answers. I do not intend to address most of the main workshop themes directly.
Instead, I want to use this time to explore some of the fundamental questions that underlie our discussions. I want to address what I view as the most important challenge confronting the world trading system - the crisis of development, which, I believe, imperils the legitimacy of the world trading system.
Trade is a means to development; children need special protection back to top
Let me be clear. I hold two fundamental beliefs about trade.
First, the purpose of trade should be to promote human development and reduce poverty.
Trade is not an end it itself. It is a means to an end. I believe that end must be sustainable human development that reduces poverty. Trade is good and useful when it serves that end. When it does not, it can be an obstacle to development. Our trade policies and institutions should be evaluated, not in terms of whether they promote more commerce, simply for the sake of more commerce. They should be evaluated on how they serve the goal of promoting development and reducing poverty. Trade, I believe, is a subset of the bigger and more fundamental matter of human development.
Secondly, children need special consideration and protection when developing trade policy.
Please bear in mind the vulnerability of children in developing countries. Ill-considered liberalisation and poorly planned trade and economic policy put children at profound risk. They basically have one opportunity to get the essential nourishment they need as infants to promote strong physical and mental growth. They get one opportunity for the chance of an education and literacy and the hope of a better future.
There have been ill-advised macroeconomic policies that had the unintended effect of closing schools, shutting health clinics, and ending jobs. If there is no money to pay the teacher, does that girl or boy have an opportunity to become literate? If those children fail to become literate, will they learn good nutrition and health care? Will they have job opportunities? Will they be cheated by unscrupulous moneylenders and corrupt bureaucrats? In short, will they avoid the cycle of poverty if bad trade policy creates a situation in which essential human services are under-financed or unavailable?
Whatever trade policies we choose, we must ensure that they promote, rather than hinder, the education, health and welfare of children. If we neglect children, we neglect the future of the world.
So, these are my two fundamental premises: 1) the purpose of trade is to promote human development and reduce poverty; and 2) children need special consideration and protection when determining trade policy.
A couple of observations back to top
As
I said earlier, I intend to pose some questions that I hope can be
considered in the discussions over the next two days. Before doing
so, however, I would like to make a couple of observations. Neither
of these observations is new and both have made elsewhere. But I
would like us to keep them in mind as we deliberate over trade
matters.
1) Costs of participating in a world trade system
Firstly, please bear in mind how difficult it is for poor nations to participate in trade negotiations. We live in a very lopsided world, in which the poor struggle to even approach the table, much less bear the costs of participation.
Overseas development aid has fallen far short of the promises made by developed countries.
In 1996, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee adopted a number of development goals, which, among other things, included targets such as(1):
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Reduction of the proportion of people living in extreme poverty in developing countries by at least one-half by 2015.
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Universal primary education in all countries by 2015.
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Elimination of gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005.
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A 67 percent reduction from the 1990 level of the death rate for infants and children under five in all developing countries by 2015.
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A 75 percent reduction from the 1990 level of the rate of maternal mortality in all developing countries by 2015.
At the Geneva 2000 Social Summit last year, the UN, World Bank, IMF and OECD released a report on the international development goals called A Better World for All. The report showed very clearly that “a better world” is, in fact, receding for many of the world’s inhabitants.
When the development goals were formulated in 1996, average OECD aid was 0.34 percent of Gross National Product. Since then, with some notable exceptions, most OECD countries have been cutting their aid budgets. As of last year, the average assistance had dropped to 0.22 percent! Tragically, between 1990-2000 real per capita assistance to the least developed countries – those which need it most - dropped by 45 percent!
If the developed countries had maintained their 1992 levels of assistance, developing countries would have received an additional US $136 billion in aid.(2) But they didn’t. Ironically, developed countries will go to the UN’s Financing for Development conference next year proclaiming that they are committed to the 1996 goals. Yet they have never given less aid as a proportion of their GNPs. Given this situation, developing countries may be sceptical about the OECD countries proclaiming their commitment to a “development round.”
This growing distance between the wealth of the North and the poverty of the South undermines world trade negotiations. There is no level playing field. Some countries have no representatives in Geneva. Others rely on a solitary individual who works out of tiny, cramped office and is saddled with numerous other chores. Meanwhile, some delegations have teams of diplomats and lawyers schooled in the subtlest nuances of trade policies and practices.
Declining overseas assistance aggravates this situation. Most developed countries have been cutting aid for a decade. These same developed countries are now requesting a new round of trade negotiations, a new round requiring more meetings, more complex discussions, more agreements, more new laws, and more concessions from developing countries.
How can we imagine that such a system will produce equitable trade outcomes? Many developing countries have neither the resources to negotiate trade agreements nor the capacity to implement them.
It can cost developing countries a great deal of money to implement and adjust to °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ agreements. At a minimum, these costs include purchasing equipment, training people, establishing systems of checks and balances, creating and strengthening institutions, and enhancing administrative and monitoring capacities. For example, a recent World Bank study noted that to gain acceptance for its meat, vegetables and fruit in industrial country markets, Argentina spent over $80 million to achieve higher levels of plant and animal sanitation. Hungary spent over $40 million to improve the level of sanitation of its slaughterhouses alone. Mexico spent more than $30 million to upgrade intellectual property laws and enforcement. Customs reform projects can easily cost $20 million. Such costs, for complying with just three of the six main Uruguay Round Agreements that involve restructuring of domestic regulations, exceed the annual development budget for seven of the 12 least developed countries for which the authors could find a figure(3).
Given the scarcity of funds for development -- not least because of plummeting aid levels -- is this really the best use of a poor nation’s resources? In some cases the answer may be “yes,” but in many cases, it clearly is not. Developing countries usually can’t choose which reforms they will make, depending on their circumstances. They have to implement the whole lot, regardless of their human and financial resources.
I find it puzzling that, for an agenda supposedly driven by economic theory, trade reforms are almost never subjected to a proper, full, cost-benefit analysis. I don’t just mean an economic forecast, or even a general equilibrium model of the pros and cons of trade reform. I mean a proper cost-benefit analysis with an attempt to calculate real opportunity costs, correct shadow prices, equitable distributional weights, externality estimates, such as the real costs of environmental degradation, and so on.
We
must give more serious attention to the very high costs for poor
nations to participate in the world trade system.
2) Assumption that open trade necessarily promotes development
My second observation is that we should examine very carefully the assumption that trade liberalisation necessarily promotes development.
As I said earlier, I’m neither an economist nor a trade expert. But a number of people who are experts doubt the conventional wisdom that trade liberalisation necessarily fosters economic growth. They also question whether the developed countries of the West and East Asia really owe their development to “open” markets.
A recent study done for the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research calls into question several previous cross-country studies that purported to demonstrate a strong link between open trade and economic growth.(11) Dani Rodrik of Harvard and co-author Francisco Rodríguez contend that major methodological problems mean that most of the studies purporting to demonstrate such a link are flawed. After a detailed analysis of several key papers, they conclude that there is little evidence that open trade policies -- in the form of lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to trading – are significantly associated with economic growth. They close with this warning:
“We do not want to leave the reader with the impression that we think trade protection is good for economic growth. We know of no credible evidence – at least for the post-1945 period – that suggests that trade restrictions are systematically associated with higher growth rates. What we would like the reader to take away from this paper is some caution and humility in interpreting the existing cross-national evidence on the relationship between trade policy and economic growth.
“The tendency to greatly overstate the systematic evidence in favour of trade openness has had a substantial influence on policy around the world. Our concern is that the priority afforded to trade policy has generated expectations that are unlikely to be met, and it may have crowded out other institutional reforms with potentially greater payoffs.”
This study and others suggest that other factors may be far more important for development than trade liberalisation. For instance: A sound development and investment strategy that fosters domestic industry with adequate incentives for learning and productivity growth; long-term spending on health and education and job training; establishing quality institutions such as a credit and banking environment in which small businesses can flourish, and so on.
I’m not necessarily an advocate of open markets or of high tariff walls. But I am an advocate of examining the assumption that trade liberalisation will necessarily lead to human development. It may; it may not – depending on the circumstances of each particular country.
I think we should also examine the commonly held belief that the industrialised countries of Europe, North America and East Asia developed through free and open trade.
Paul Bairoch, a respected economic historian who works here at the University of Geneva, doesn’t find much to support that argument. He notes that it wasn’t until 1842 that Britain really began to lower her trade barriers – after nearly a century and a half of protected industrialisation. She imposed “free trade” on India and in the process all but destroyed India’s highly developed textile and iron industries. Latin America’s textile industries suffered a similar fate.(6)
The United Kingdom, France, Germany and especially the United States, all developed their domestic industries behind tariff walls and with other instruments such as below market-rate loans. A recent econometric study in one of the top economic journals showed very clearly that tariffs were in fact positively correlated with economic growth for these and six other developed countries between 1875 and 1914.(7)
More recently, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea used various measures to industrialise that were anything but “free trade.” Many of these measures are now banned under °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ rules or soon could be.(8) They include high levels of tariff and non-tariff barriers, public ownership of large segments of banking and industry, export subsidies, local content requirements, import-export linkages, patent and copyright infringements, restrictions on capital flows, directed and subsidised credit and so on.(9)
Let me be clear. I am not suggesting that a blanket policy of protecting infant industries is the solution. Such industries, protected for too long, can become bloated and inefficient. Encouraging exports is definitely important. But there must be a more nuanced approach to each country’s particular situation, its history and its stage of development. Countries need to tailor trade policies to their particular situations. Comparative economic advantage is dynamic and can be acquired. It is not static. Learning, information and productivity growth are particularly critical. Economic history clearly demonstrates that government institutions and assistance in various forms, including tariffs, can play an important role here.(10)
I am not convinced that trade liberalisation necessarily promotes development. I suggest we picture the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan or South Korea when they were developing. Would they have enjoyed such robust economic development if powerful, industrialised nations had forced them to follow current – and proposed – °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ rules?
Advocating rapid trade liberalisation for all developing countries in all economic sectors condemns poor nations to low levels of industrialisation and dependence on a narrow range of export commodities. Each developing country should be able to tailor its trade policies for its particular situation and its development strategy.
Five questions back to top
Okay,
you’ve heard my observations about the cost of participating in
the world trade system and the assumption that open trade promotes
development. Now I will pose five questions that I urge us to
consider during the discussions of the next two days.
Question 1: What does it mean to claim that trade reform results in a “net benefit”?
Advocates of trade liberalisation often claim that trade reform results in a “net benefit.” Generally speaking, a “net benefit” is said to result when the overall benefits, usually measured in monetary terms, are greater than the costs. But greater for whom? Are the winners rich or poor? Where do they live? In wealthy enclaves or in poor rural areas? Which regions benefit? What are the gender effects? Does the “net benefit” result in greater or lesser inequality? Does the “net benefit” make it harder for poor women to feed their families but easier for the middle class to buy low cost TVs? These are the kinds of vital questions that lurk behind the glib assurances about the “net benefits” of trade reform.
Three years ago, I was in Indonesia just after the Suharto government fell and the economy collapsed. We can blame the economic disaster on political turmoil, corruption, bad loans, capital flight, an artificially inflated currency, whatever. I think it is fair to say, however, that Indonesia had been forced to embrace aspects of a free-market structural adjustment programme that lacked many of the safeguards that could have protected its economy and its people.
Near the port of Jakarta, I met with families whose weekly incomes had fallen from $10 to $1 because of devaluation. Meanwhile, the cost of rice, the staple of their diet, had multiplied several times. The children, especially the younger ones, were at risk for cholera and diseases related to malnutrition. Because their parents could not longer afford tuition, many children had dropped out of school. Some were earning the equivalent of 30 cents a day shelling mussels. I remember meeting a spirited 10-year-old girl named Mariana. She had remained in school. Her father was earning a dollar a day collecting sea sand in a small wooden boat, then bagging it and selling it. He was one of the fortunate ones.
World Vision began a food-for-work project in Mariana’s slum neighbourhood. In exchange for rice, the unemployed cleaned sewers, rebuilt walkways, and organised to meet community needs. In time, some found paying jobs and some children returned to school. But, three years later, most of Mariana’s neighbours have not recovered what little they once had.
So what was the “net benefit” of economic reform and structural adjustment for Indonesia? Walk around Mariana’s neighbourhood near the port in Jakarta and the poor will tell you: “There was no benefit. We lost.”
Even in cases where economic reform and trade liberalisation does bring net benefits to a country or region, there are certain to be costs as well as benefits - losers as well as winners. We know that. The °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ acknowledges that. Our challenge is to do a better job of identifying who the losers are likely to be, where they are, and how they can best be helped, compensated, or, better yet, spared from suffering in the first place.
The °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ and its powerful member governments should pursue a balanced approach that considers both the winners and losers of trade reform. The question ought to be: How can trade best promote development and poverty reduction? Trade policies should not enrich a few at the expense of the many. They should ensure that the benefits of trade are shared equitably.
Question
2: If trade reform is good, is rapid reform always better?
Trade policy recommendations are often made on the basis of static analysis – “snapshots” of the economy before and after a policy change. If the second picture is better than the first – that is, if it shows “net benefits” from the change – the conclusion is that the policy change should be implemented.
But what are the dynamics of the adjustment process of getting from the first picture to the second? How are people’s lives impacted? Are there alternative jobs available for workers displaced by plant closures? Are there safety nets in place when they become unemployed? Can a 45-year-old worker quickly retrain for another job or will he and his family end up destitute? Often models predicting gains from trade assume that displaced workers and resources will be re-deployed elsewhere in the economy. But what if such redeployment is not possible?
In Ecuador, World Vision documented the effects on workers of trade-induced changes in the marketplace. They found serious psychological, and indeed spiritual traumas, with long-term consequences, with idled workers made to feel unwanted, worthless and hopeless. Social standing, respect, and honour were highly dependent on their jobs.(4) Trade-induced structural adjustments affect more than “factors of production.” They affect people. An important consideration must be the capacity of people and society to absorb the effects of trade reform, especially rapid reform.
With rapid trade reform, the poor are likely to be the first to suffer and the last to benefit. Especially when there is no social safety net. Many developing countries cannot afford unemployment or health insurance. Trade agreements must recognise the social impact of the policies they put in place.
Aside from the speed at which trade reform is pushed, it is also important to evaluate the quality of any economic growth resulting from trade reform. The quality of growth matters. A single-minded focus on exports for exports’ sake can have devastating social and environmental consequences. In Latin America, Africa, and other parts of the developing world, some commodities with high environmental costs have been overproduced to compensate for the reduced price they get in the global market. If trade reform aggravates these conditions, it is not quality trade reform.
Question
3: Why do developed countries advocate the benefits of “open” trade yet keep their markets relatively closed to
many goods from developing countries?
Many from developing countries will share my frustration at the lack of real progress in opening the markets of developed countries to your goods. Wealthy nations often shut out your most important products, especially agricultural commodities, processed foods, textiles, clothing and footwear.
Access to developed country markets can make a tremendous difference to poor communities. I’ll give you an example from our experience with poor farmers in Brazil. In this case, there was a way around trade barriers. We began this project two years ago with 500 farm families in the impoverished northeast states of Alagoas and Rio Grande do Norte. We called it a “fair trade” program. The goal was to connect these farmers with international partners so that their produce could be sold directly at prices fair to both the farmer and the retailer. The farmers, who receive training in marketing, finance and appropriate technology, retain control from production to final sale.(5)
So far, the results are very encouraging. The farmers have sold cashew nuts, green peppers, watermelons and pineapples to large international supermarket chains in Europe. They have seen their average monthly income increase from $75 to $210. They have been able to pay their debts, maintain their equipment, and increase production. Their produce has gained visibility in both local and international markets where it is known for its quality and for the use of the “fair trade” label.
Unfortunately,
this good news from Brazil is the exception. In dozens of other
countries where we work with small producers, they find it extremely
difficult to export their goods to developed countries. The barriers
against their goods cost poor countries billions of dollars every
year in lost trade – far, far more than these countries receive in
development assistance. We need policies that will increase market
access for goods from developing countries while reducing the abuses
of antidumping and special safeguard measures.
Question 4: What institutional requirements need to be in place to make sure that trade promotes development?
Trade will not promote sound development if civil institutions are corrupt, in disarray or non-existent. Such institutions include adequate recognition and protection of property rights, the rule of law, contract enforcement, an independent judiciary, a skilled and honest bureaucracy, safety nets for those adversely affected by sudden economic change, institutions to manage conflict and so on.
How are these institutions to be developed in countries where they are weak or non-existent? How long does it take? How long will it take to rebuild the capacities of the state and social capital in countries devastated by ill-considered structural adjustment programs? What human and financial resources are required? How should the °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ treat such countries? Can developing countries be lumped together and arbitrarily assigned a mere extra five or 10 years to implement °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ agreements?
Three weeks ago, I visited our area development programs in Mongolia. It was not my first visit. I was also there in the winter of 1998. Other than the change of seasons and a change of government, I must say that not much appeared to have changed. To be sure, World Vision was doing more work with abandoned children, juvenile offenders and unemployed workers. But our staff and the rest of the Mongolian people, abruptly swept from communism into laissez-faire capitalism a decade ago, continue to live in an environment in which many institutions are either absent or ineffective. The banking system is obsolete. Transport is antiquated or inadequate. Land titles are unclear. Ill-advised legislation and corruption have made economic reform extremely challenging. Local industries are so small and under-capitalised that most products are imported.
Mongolia, a °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ member, is not classified as a “least developed country.” It is termed a “developing country.” As such the °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ requires it to reduce any tariffs on agricultural products (its principal exports) by 24 percent over 10 years. Reasonable perhaps until one considers the great task Mongolia faces in nation building. In the absence of well-developed institutions, how does trade best promote development in countries like Mongolia?
In
short, a comprehensive development and trade strategy must factor in
the time, resources, and expertise required to build sound
institutions in developing countries.
Question 5: Is it not possible for the °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ to give more consideration to market structure and market power?
Much economic and trade modelling assumes perfect competition. But, as we all know, the real world does not always work like that. Some corporations are extremely large while most businesses and some economies are small. For example, the combined sales revenues of General Motors and Wal-Mart last year were larger than the Gross Domestic Products of all of the 48 sub-Saharan African countries put together.(12)
An analysis of market structure and market power in key areas like agriculture, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and financial services is critical for determining appropriate trade policies. Yet market structure and market power do not get anywhere near the attention they deserve.
We don’t have to search far for an example of how power structures the market. As is evident from the news of the past few months, the market power of the pharmaceutical corporations has greatly affected the availability of AIDS drugs in developing countries. It’s interesting to note, however, that popular opinion has been so strong against these corporations that they have dramatically slashed prices on retroviral drugs. The United States, recently dropped its suit against Brazil for manufacturing inexpensive copies of trademarked AIDS drugs.
The size and vertical integration of agribusiness and biotechnology firms is another example of concentrated market power. Such concentration must be addressed in drafting trade policy around agriculture, medical products and other goods. The Brazilian melon farmer and the transnational agribusiness corporation are simply not in the same arena. What is puzzling to me is that market power and market structure are so rarely considered in trade negotiations.
Conclusion: Is the time right for a new round of trade negotiations? back to top
I’ve given you my observations. I’ve raised five questions. I’ll remind you of my fundamental belief that the purpose of trade is to promote human development and reduce poverty with special consideration for protecting children.
Now you ask: Is the time right for a new round of trade negotiations?
I think some things need to happen first. Namely:
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There should be a comprehensive review of the Uruguay Round’s impacts on the poor before launching a new round.
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The concerns of developing countries over the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements should be addressed, and some of the agreements, especially TRIPS, need to be reviewed. Developing countries should not be expected to agree to a new round before their concerns about the last one have been addressed.
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The agenda needs to be clarified before launching a new round. Developing countries should not be expected to sign a blank cheque by agreeing to a new round without being sure what’s in it!
In closing, I want to highlight again that our goal is human development and the eradication of poverty – not increasing trade for its own sake, without regard for who benefits and who suffers.
The GATT, as we know, was born in the shadow of World War II. For its first few rounds, it consisted primarily of negotiations between countries at similar stages of economic, social and institutional development. But today, the °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ consists of 142 nations, from the richest and most powerful, to the very poorest. The system provides some scope for differentiation, in terms of Special and Differential treatment for developing countries, and some exemptions for Least Developed Countries, but it falls painfully short of meeting the vast range of needs among developing countries.
Development policy requires a complex understanding of systems, combining economic, social and cultural institutions and their changing interactions over time. What is good for one phase of the development process may be bad for the next phase. This is particularly true with trade. For example, the loss of key industries at an early stage of development can have a permanent damaging effect.
Trade policy prescriptions for a given country at a given time must be anchored in a thorough understanding of that country’s situation at that point in time. We must know how it got there. And we must encourage an authentic, domestically conceived development strategy.(13)
The world trading system, as it currently exists, falls far short of incorporating country specific development strategies that promote genuine human development and protect children. But it could. My hope is that our discussions these two days will help take us in that direction.
Notes:
1 : DAC, (1996) “Shaping the 21st Century: the Contribution of Development Co-operation”, May, Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, Paris, 20 pp, especially pp. 8-11 and 15-16. back to text
2 : From: ‘The Reality of Aid 2000’. back to text
3 : Finger, J.M. and Schuler, P., (1999) “Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge”, The °ÄÃÅÁùºÏ²Ê¹ÙÍø×ÊÁÏ/World Bank Conference on Developing Countries' Interests in a Millennium Round, 20-21 September 1999, Geneva, p. 25. back to text
4 : This point came from World Vision Ecuador. back to text
5 : From “Fair Trading Improves Lives of Poor Brazilian Families”, By Betânia Barreto, World Vision News, 15 May 2001. back to text
6 : Bairoch, P., (1993) Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. back to text
7 : O'Rourke, K.H., (2000) “Tariffs and Growth in the late 19th Century”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 110, No. 463, April, pp. 456-483. The other countries in the study were: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway and Sweden. back to text
8 : Rodrik, D., (1995) “Getting interventions right: how South Korea and Taiwan grew rich”, Economic Policy, Vol. 20, April, pp. 55-107; Adelman, I., (2000) “Fifty Years of Economic Development: What Have we Learned?”, Keynote address at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, June 26-28, Paris, 43 pp. back to text
9 : Rodrik, D., (2001) “Trading in Illusions”, Foreign Policy, March-April. back to text
10 : See for example: Bruton, H.J., (1998) “A Reconsideration of Import Substitution”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36, No. 2, June, pp. 903-936. back to text
11 : Rodríguez, F. and Rodrik, D., (2000) “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptics Guide to the Cross-National Evidence”, In Macroeconomics Annual 2000 ed. Bernanke, B. and Rogoff, K.S.; MIT Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. See also: Rodrik, D., (2001) “The Global Governance of Trade as if Development Really Mattered”, New York, Paper prepared for the UNDP, June, 58 pp. Both papers can be found by clicking back to text
12 : Source: World Bank and Fortune (2000) The Fortune Global 500, Vol. 142. No. 3, p. F1. back to text
13 : Adelman, I., (2001) “Fallacies in Development Theory and Their Implications for Policy”, In Frontiers of Development Economics: The Future in Perspective ed. Meier, G.M. and Stiglitz, J.E.; The World Bank & Oxford University Press, Washington DC & Oxford, pp. 103-134. back to text