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by

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[1] The views expressed in this paper are the authors' alone, and do not represent the views of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency nor the United States Treasury Department.

ABSTRACT

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (known as the GATS) is an important new element in the international framework that affects the regulation of every WTO Member's financial sector. However, except for a limited number of country-specific case studies, no attempt has been made to compare WTO commitments to open the domestic banking sector to foreign banks with actual regulatory practice in a systematic and comprehensive manner on a cross-country basis. Nor has much attention been devoted to systematically and comprehensively assess the degree to which WTO Members discriminate against foreign bank. This paper draws upon a new and comprehensive dataset consisting of the commitments countries made at the WTO and the regulations actually imposed on foreign banks by those countries. The dataset covers 123 WTO Members for whom there was also information available on their current regulatory regime for banking (based on the responses to a World Bank survey as discussed in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006)). On the basis of that data, the authors develop indices measuring the degree of openness to foreign banking based upon both commitments made and actual regulatory practice, with a view to assessing the overall extent to which countries open their borders to foreign banks more than they are legally obliged to do based upon their WTO commitments. The dataset is also used to assess the overall extent to which countries discriminate against foreign banks by regulating them less favorably than domestic banks. Although our results are still quite preliminary, they do show substantial divergences between commitments and practices. Indices of market openness and discrimination reveal wide differences among the 123 countries in the sample. The paper also identifies various factors that help explain the level of commitments that WTO Members have made.

JEL classification numbers: D78, F13, G20, G21, G28

Keywords: Bank regulation, banking, financial services, financial sector liberalization, foreign bank entry, GATS, trade in services, WTO.

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Introduction

The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (known as the GATS) is the first multilateral trade agreement to promote the liberalization of services in countries around the world. It is an important new element in the international framew countries open their markets to foreign banks more than they are legally obliged to do based upon their commitments. The dataset is also used to assess the overall extent to which countries discriminate against foreign banks by regulating them less favorably than domestic banks. The dataset covers 123 WTO Members for whom there was also information available on their current regulatory regime for banking (based on the responses to a World Bank survey as discussed in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006)). The dataset may eventually enable one to examine further the extent to which divergences between actual practice and commitments promote or retard bank development, efficiency and stability, and the factors that help explain such divergences.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief explanation of the GATS. Section II provides an overview of the literature and methodologies used in the past to measure barriers to trade in financial services. Section III introduces ou1(een ac62(S)7.4)]3rt to wh3nTJ13.84s disciplines governing WTO Members' trade in services and to achieve progressively higher levels of liberalization of trade in services, including financial services, through periodic rounds of multilateral negotiations. The GATS applies in principle to all measures (irrespective of the government-level at which they are being enacted) affecting trade in all services supplied through four modes of supply: cross-border, consumption abroad, commercial presence and presence of natural persons.

The GATS has an admittedly wide scope. It applies to all measures by WTO Members affecting trade in services. Services include any service in any sector, including financial services, but excluding the so-called "services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority." [3] Financial services have been defined in the GATS as including any service of a financial nature offered by a financial service supplier, including all insurance and insurance-related services (e.g., direct insurance, reinsurance, insurance intermediation, and auxiliary insurance services), as well as all banking and other financial services (e.g., deposit taking, lending, financial leasing, asset management, trading in securities, and financial advice).

The measures to which the agreement applies are those taken not only by central governments (or its regulatory agencies) but also by subfederal governments or regulatory agencies (at provincial or state level) or non-governmental bodies exercising regulatory powers delegated by government (e.g., securities or futures exchanges or markets).

Trade in services is defined by reference to the four modes of supply identified above. These modes of supply are supposed to capture the various ways in which trade in service can take place. Although the definition of the four modes of supply offers scope for interpretation, logic and scheduling practice indicate that they should be understood from the perspective of the host-country, or in the trade jargon, the importing country. The following examples, taking Italy as a hypothetical host country, may help clarify how the modes of supply work. In mode 1

[3] In the case of financial services, "services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority" are the following: 1) the activities conducted by a central bank or monetary authority or by any other public entity in pursuit of monetary and exchange rate policies; 2) activities forming part of a statutory system of social security or public retirement plans; and 3) other activities conducted by a public entity for the account or with the guarantee or using the financial resources of the Government. However, if a WTO Member allows any of the activities referred to in 2) and 3) to be conducted by its financial service suppliers in competition with a public entity or a financial service

transactions, it is actually the service and not the service supplier that crosses the national border (*e.g.*, the granting of a loan by a New York based bank to an Italian consumer in Italy). Mode 2 involves the consumption of a service abroad (*e.g.*, the opening of a bank account by an Italian resident while travelling in the United States). Mode 3 entails the commercial presence of a supplier of one country in the jurisdiction of another country (*e.g.*, when a United States bank or extent of national treatment obligations[7] are included in national schedules. Commitments on these two principles – market access and national treatment – are entered into with respect to each of the four modes of supply. For example, a WTO Member will be subject to market access and national treatment obligations with respect to deposit-taking services only if it has included that service in its schedule, and to the extent provided therein. In other words, the inclusion of a particular service in a schedule does not mean free access to the market under national treatment conditions. In fact, access to the market in order to provide that particular service may have been subject to certain "market access" limitations (e.g., on the number of suppliers allowed) or certain "national treatment" limitations (e.g., higher income taxes for foreign suppliers). As a result of the positive and highly flexible approach to making commitments, access obligations across WTO Members can be asymmetric and their extent will depend on the specific features of the commitments entered into by each country. Member countries may choose to retain full discretion with respect to the treatment of foreign firms and hence not make specific commitments guaranteeing specific access and treatment. WTO Members may also choose to provide greater access and more fa commitments or obligations under the GATS; and do not need to be inscribed in the national schedules of specific commitments. The exact m

arbitrarily defined a set of benchmark "guesstimates" of tariff equivalents for each sector to reflect the most protectionist nation. A value of 200% was chosen for the sectors where access tended to be prohibited by most countries, and which did not appear in most schedules (maritime cabotage, air transport, postal services, voice telecommunications, and life insurance); while values between 20% and 50 % were assigned to sectors where access was less constrained. Each country and sector was then assigned a value related to that benchmark. For example, the financial services sector (excluding insurance) was assigned a tariff equivalent of 50% (The list can be seen in the Annex 2 Table to Hoekman's paper). The "tariff equivalent" of a given country was then obtained by multiplying this guesstimate by (1-*x/y*), where *x* is the weighted coverage for each sector per country and *y* is the total coverage possible for each category. Thus, if the most restrictive country worldwide had restrictions equivalent to a 50%, then a country with a 0.9 restrictiveness index would have a tariff equivalent of 45 percent (i.e., 0.9 times 50).

As explained by Hoekman, the value of the numbers that emerge are a function of the 'reasonableness' of the assumed benchmark vector of tariff equivalents, and the correlation between commitments made in the GATS context and a Member's actual policy stance. Clearly the methodology could be improved by incorporating information on the actual policy regimes in force in the various countries, something we attempt to do in this paper for banking.

The Hoekman methodology has several drawbacks. First, it does not assign weights to entry barriers based on their differential impacts on the economy. Since all limitations receive the same weighting (0.5), minor impediments are treated exactly the same as a complete refusal of foreign entry into a domestic market. Second, the indices are constructed on the basis of the GATS schedules of commitments, many of which do not provide an accurate description of the actual barriers. Third, considering an unscheduled sector as being completely closed to new entry does not give a clear picture of the situation either. It may well be the case -and there is some anecdotal evidence in that regard- that actual practices are more liberal than commitments, and therefore the indices may be overstating the degree of protection. Finally, it does not take into account the differences in "tradability" under individual modes of supply.

Subsequent studies have attempted to develop more complex weighting systems and tried to complement the information provided by the GATS schedules with other sources. Hardin and Holmes (1997) developed frequency indices to measure the size of barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI) across service industries. Like Hoekman, they focused on a broad range of industries and not only on financial services. But, unlike Hoekman, they obtained information from other sources, such as APEC Members' Individual Action Plans and the *APEC Guide to Investment Regimes of Member Economies*. The restrictions identified were classified into five categories: foreign equity limits on all firms; foreign equity limits on existing firms, none on greenfield; screening and approval requirements; control and management restrictions; and input and operational restrictions (see Table 1). Scores were then assigned to these restrictions based on subjective assessments of their relative economic costs, ranging from 1 for a complete ban on FDI to 0 for a completely open regime. Details of the scores used are reproduced in Table 1. For each individual GATS subsector, these scores were added to obtain an index; these were then further aggregated into indices for 11 broad sectors. Each sector index was obtained by taking the simple average of the subsector indices. Hardin and Holmes also conducted sensitivity analysis by recalculating the indices using two alternative scoring systems.

Claessens and Glaessner (1998) calculated more elaborate "degree of openness" indices for financial services in eight Asian economies: Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. They focused on both the barriers to entry and the barriers to the cross-border provision of financial services. Barriers were classified into six categories, five of them relating to entry (limits to establishment and ownership; limits on establishing branch offices and ATMs; restrictions on lending/business activities; the extent of universal banking; and residency requirements (*e.g.*, composition of boards of directors); and another one grouping restrictions on cross-border trade. Box 1, reproduced from the paper by Claessens and Glaessner, provides the criteria used to create the ratings. In each of these categories, an economy is assigned a score ranging 30.0494243 Tw[e exteng tss al3

Weightings were applied to the five entry categories for banking, as follows:

▪ establishment and ownership	0.30
▪ offices and ATMs	0.25
▪ lending and business activity	0.30
▪ universal banking	0.10
▪ and residency requirements	0.05.[10]

[10] The weightings are not explicitly indicated in the paper by Claessens and Glaessner, but are reported by McGuire (1999), who applied the same methodology to quantify restrictions on trade in financial services in Australia.

4	Some limits on financial activities or approval required.
3	Limits on activities of offices of foreign branches to deposit-taking. Approval required for new products.
2	Limits on foreign branch activities in foreign exchange, credit cards, trust services.
1	Restrictions on all activities normally undertaken by international banks with universal banking rights.
E.	Residency requirement
5	No restrictions on composition of board membership; no residency requirement for membership to stock exchange.
4	Restrictions on composition of board membership to at least one national.
3	Restrictions on board membership by foreigners according to proportion of ownership; residency requirement for membership in the stock exchange; locally based CEO; limits on temporary stay of executives.
2	Restrictions on board membership by foreigners to less than one half.
1	Restrictions on board membership by foreigners to one half or more.
F.	Cross-border trade
5	Free access to offshore financial instruments; no capital controls.
4	Free access allowed but solicitation or advertising by foreign institutions not permitted.
3	Access to instruments subject to annual limits or access to certain specified products in insurance; registration for borrowing; permission required for participation in issues.
2	Limits on deposit acceptance, offshore borrowing/convertibility; minimum retention requirement for domestic insurers; dealing/trading limited to certain foreign stock exchanges or IPOs limited to residents; overseas investment for institutional investors allowed but subject to restrictions.
1	Controls on cross border supply of all financial services.

Note: The rankings refer to relative degree of openness only among the eight countries included in the study as of the state of the financial services negotiations in mid-1995 or in practice as of end-1996.
Source: Claessens and Glaessner (1998)

An interesting feature of the Claessens and Glaessner approach is that they computed indices for both actual restrictions and GATS commitments. They compiled the list of actual restrictions from a number of sources and, to the extent possible, cross-checked these with country officials

▪	No new entry or unbound for new entry	0.10
▪	Discretionary licensing for new entry	0.25
▪	Ceiling on foreign equity at less than 50%	0.50
▪	Ceiling on foreign equity at more than 50%	0.75
▪	Restrictions on the legal form of commercial presence	0.75
▪	Other minor restrictions	0.75

Assigning a higher value to the presence of restrictions than to an entry of "unbound" reflects the judgement that a binding in itself has liberalizing value (Table 2). In each sector, the liberalization index, L, for each country,j, is defined as:

$$L^j = \Sigma w_i r_i^j \quad \text{summed over } i = 1, 2, 3,$$

where w_i is the modal weight and r_i is the numerical value of the most restrictive measure applied by country j to mode i. The liberalization index is thus the modal weighted average of the value of the most restrictive measure applied by a country to each mode in the sector.

The regional liberalization indices were calculated either as simple averages of country indices or as GDP share weighted averages. That is:

$$\text{simple } L = \Sigma L^j/n, \qquad \text{summed over } j = 1....n,$$

and

$$\text{weighted } L = \Sigma g^j L^j \qquad \text{summed over } j = 1....n,$$

where n are the number of countries in the region, and g^j is the share of each country in the region's GDP. Higher values of the liberalization index indicate that commitments have a greater liberalizing content.

A still more elaborate set of frequency measures was constructed by McGuire and Schuele (2000) to analyse banking services in 38 countries. Two groups of restrictions were identified, those affecting commercial presence and other restrictions. Restrictions on commercial presence cover restrictions on licensing, direct investment, joint venture arrangements, and the permanent movement of people. The "other restrictions" category covers restrictions on raising funds,

Like Claessens and Glaessner (1998), our data allows us to compute indices for both actual restrictions based on information provided in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) and the GATS commitments. Like McGuire and Schuele (2000), our data allows us to compute indices for domestic and foreign banks, to separately quantify the extent to which regulation and commitments restrict domestic and international competition.

There are in fact two indices: one for current practice and another for GATS commitments; and another one comparing the degree of discrimination between domestic and foreign banks. The way in which the indices are constructed is provided in Table 4, with definitions of the variables provided in Table 5.

The indices apply only to restrictions affecting the supply through commercial presence, which is the main form of delivery of banking services, and for which comparable information was gathered on both the current regulatory practice and the WTO commitments of different countries. We also provide limited information on the commitments for the cross-border supply of banking services for the 123 countries in our sample.

Seven categories of restrictions were identified:

- Licensing of banks
- Foreign equity limitations
- Forms of entry
- Limitations on the total value of foreign banks' assets
- Other business of banks: securities services
- Other business of banks: insurance services
- Minimum capital requirements

These categories cover the most common market access restrictions (e.g., licensing of banks; foreign equity limitations; forms of entry; limitations on the foreign share of total bank assets), as well as the most significant national treatment limitations (e.g., higher minimum capital requirements applicable to foreign banks). The degree of restrictiveness of each category was assessed, from the most restrictive to the least restrictive. The greater the restrictiveness of the measure, the higher the score. Scores range from 0 (least restrictive) to

1 (most restrictive). We also assigned weights to restriction categories by making an a priori assessment of the impact of restrictions on economic efficiency. Those restrictions considered to impose a greater cost on economic efficiency were given a greater weighting.

We also calculated an index score for domestic and foreign banks to separately quantify the extent to which regulation restricts domestic and international competition. Both the domestic index and the foreign index are based to the extent possible on the current practice index. Whenever some information was only available from the GATS schedules (e.g., on the restrictions affecting the composition of the board of directors), the latter was used. The foreign index covers restrictions relevant to foreign banks, and the domestic index covers all restrictions applying to banks. N13.6(l)-15.8(y)9.525 0ng a Stely3-co1c-20.7(vmb-1.ofntif)64

IV. Comparative Information on Actual Practice vs. Commitments

Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public	24
Lending of all types	25
Financial leasing	21
All payment and money transmission services	18
Guarantees and commitments	24
Trading for own account or for account of customers	19
Participation in issues of all kinds of securities	15
Money broking	11
Asset management	12
Settlement and clearing services	8
Provision and transfer of financial information	53
Advisory, intermediation and other auxiliary financial services	53

It is clear that there is substantial variation in the access granted and the treatment accorded to foreign firms by WTO Members with respect to entry into their domestic banking sectors. Table 6 provides more comprehensive information on the commitments made by WTO Members when grouped by all countries, developed countries, developing countries, and countries with populations greater than 2 million. Of the developed countries, all 29 make specific commitments to open their domestic banking sectors to foreign firms. In contrast, ne

The second objective under this section addresses commitments from a banking perspective, trying to analyze to what extent they provide information on regulatory barriers regarding ownerships and activities that may be important when seeking access to a foreign market. One finds that the number of countries that allow various ownership linkages or wider bank activities among the 123 WTO Members reviewed to be as follows:

1. Can non-financial firms own shares in commercial banks? Insufficient data[12]
2. Can non-bank financial firms own shares in commercial banks? Insufficient data
3. What kind of securities activities can banks engage in? Underwriting=**50**, dealing and brokering=50, dealing

restrictiveness. Also, six WTO Members do not actually allow foreign entry through subsidiaries or branches even though in their schedules of commitments they indicated they do. Such restrictions may of course be imposed on prudential grounds as noted earlier. If this is the reason for these differences, the issue of what is indeed "prudential" may become a potentially contentious regulatory term.

There are also differences between commitments and actual practice with respect to allowable securities and insurance activities for banks. A large number of these WTO Members prohibit banks to engage in these activities in their schedules of commitments, but in actual practice do the opposite. The same situation arises with respect to whether the minimum capital entry requirement is similar for local and foreign banks. But here the case is quite different. The reason is that 26 WTO Members in actual practice set similar capital requirements even though in their schedules they did not commit to doing so.

To further compare commitments to actual practice, information on the number of entry applications from foreign firms and the number denied is used. Table 8 contains this type of information, for all countries and for the countries when grouped by development category and population size. As may be seen, for WTO Members for which information is available less than half of them have actually had foreign firms applying for licenses to enter, whether by acquisition, subsidiary or branch. Of those countries that have received such applications, the average rejection rates are 30 percent or less, depending on the desired means of entry. However, the rejection rates are higher for developing countries than developed countries, and highest for applications to enter through acquisitions or subsidiaries regardless of development or size category.

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branching, although they have not made a commitment on that at the WTO.

The application data are also used to examine the differences between the commitments made by WTO Members and actual practice. Table 9 provides information on commitments relating to limitations on the number of foreign banks, limitations or prohibition on new entry, and limitations on foreign equity in banks. Specifically, this table compares the number of foreign entry applications in the case in which WTO Members commit to imposing no limitations to the case in which they do not. As may be seen, even though the actual number of cases in which there are no applications for foreign entry is about the same whether there are limitations or not, there are more than three times as many entry applications in countries that commit to not imposing any limitation. Table 10, moreover, shows that the foreign ownership share of total bank assets is less in those countries that impose a limit on such ownership in their schedules of commitments as compared to those countries that do not.

Lastly, comparing current practice to commitments, it is useful to examine the pairwise correlations between the two different measures of market openness. To the extent that actual practice and commitments reflect the same regulatory policy stances, one would expect the correlation between these two measures of openness to be significant and equal to one. Table 11 contains such correlations. As discussed earlier, WTO Members i) may refrain from making commitments on a specific sector (e.g. banking), retaining therefore full discretion with respect to the degree of market access and national treatment afforded foreign firms; or ii) may undertake some commitment to guarantee a some degree of openness as specified in their schedule. One finds that there is no significant correlation between full discretion (WTO 103) and in practice prohibiting foreign firms from entering through acquisitions, subsidiaries or branches (WB 1.121-1.12.3). There is also no significant correlation between WTO commitments to allow foreign entry and current practice. One does find, however, that there is a significantly positive correlation between full discretion (WTO 103) and the rejection rate of foreign entry applications (WB 1.10b/WB 1.10a). Also, there is a significant and positive correlation between full discretion (WTO103) and restrictions on allowing banks to engage in various real estate activities (WB4.5.1-4.5.3). Furthermore, the results indicate that in the case of restrictions allowing banks to engage in various securities activities, Section 4

The objective of this section is to analyze in a very preliminary manner what motivates the scope of commitments countries made at the WTO. In other words, the objective is to analyze whether commitments are related to the following variables:

- Degree of competition in the market (measured by deposit and asset 3-bank concentration ratios, ConDepo and ConAsset, respectively)
- Share of foreign banks in the market (WB3.8.2)
- Share of state-owned banks in the market (WB3.8.1)
- Banking quality and efficiency (measured by non-performing loans and net interest margin, NPL and NIM, respectively)
- Economic size and development (measured by GDP and GDP per capita)
- Bank development (measured by bank credit extended to private sector, BnkDev)
- Institutional quality (measured by a law and order variable, and a degree of corruption - where higher values indicate less corruption, Laws and Corrupt, respectively)
- WB 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 8.1 (see Table 5 for definitions)

Table 13 indicates that countries with full discretion (WTO 103) tend to have lower levels of GDP per capita, higher levels of non-performing loans, higher net interest margins, greater bank concentration and more corruption. Countries that prohibit entry through acquisitions, subsidiaries, and branches also tend to have lower level of GDP per capita, higher levels of non-performing loans, greater bank concentration, less bank development, and more corruption. Countries with an explicit insurance deposit system tend to schedule commitments, do not prohibit foreign bank entry, and allow banks to engage in insurance, underwriting securities, dealing and brokering, and mutual funds activities. Countries in which more than one body/agency that grants licenses to banks tend to make no commitments and prohibit foreign bank entry.

Table 14 presents correlations between indices of openness or discrimination and potential factors that explain the commitments made. The results indicate that countries with greater foreign ownership of total bank asset also tend to have biggest divergence between the indices

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Table 1. Weighting and Scoring System Used by Hardin and Holmes (1997)

	1.00	Banks are restricted in providing certain services such as credit cards, leasing and consumer finance
	0.25	Banks are directed to lend to housing and small business
	0.00	Banks can lend to any source with only prudential restrictions
0.10		*Other business of banks: insurance & securities services*
	1.00	Banks can only provide banking services
	0.50	Banks can provide banking services plus one other line of business: insurance or securities services
	0.00	No restrictions on conducting other lines of business
0.05		*Expanding the number of banking outlets*
	1.00	One outlet with no new outlets permitted
	0.75	Number of outlets is limited in number and location
	0.25	Expansion of outlets subject to non-prudential regulatory

Table 4. Computation of Indices of Market Openness and Discrimination

			Actual Practice v. Commitments	Discrimination against Foreign Banks

Weight	Score	Restriction Category	Practice v. Commitments		Discrimination
			Current practice index	Commitment index	Relevance for

Table 5. Codes and Definitions for WTO Commitments and WB Actual Practice

Code	Country	Sub
WTO 103	Full discretion (no commitment)	
WTO 104	Is there discretionary licensing or application of Economic Needs Tests?	

Table 5. Codes and Definitions for WTO Commitments and WB Actual Practice

Code	Country	Sub
		from foreign entities? How many of those

Table 6. Differences in WTO Commitments by Member Countries

	Number of Countries	More Restrictive	Less Restrictive	% More Restrictive
	123	28	95	22.76
	123	65	58	52.85
	123	86	37	69.92
	123	77	46	62.60
	123	58	65	47.15
	123	60	63	48.78
	123	38	85	30.89
	123	41	82	33.33
	123	41	82	33.33
	123	33	90	26.83
	123	44	79	35.77
	123	42	81	34.15
	123	34	89	27.64
	123	73	50	59.35
	123	70	53	56.91
	123	81	42	65.85
	123	110	13	89.43

Developed Countries

	Number of Countries	More Restrictive	Less Restrictive	% More Restrictive
	29	0	29	0.00
	29	3	26	10.34
	29	1	28	3.45
	29	15	14	51.72
	29	8	21	27.59
	29	7	22	24.14
	29	1	28	3.45
	29	1	28	3.45
	29	0	29	0.00
	29	1	28	3.45
	29	2	27	6.90
	29	0	29	0.00
	29	0	29	0.00
	29	8	21	27.59
	29	7	22	24.14
	29	9	20	31.03
	29	3	26	10.34

Table 6: Differences in P(le 6: Differences   Commi)TT16.0550.j/TT2 05Table 6: D7fferentments by Member Countrifer(cont)

Table 7: Differences in Actual Practice vs. Commitments

	WTO = Yes		WTO = No	
	WB = Yes	WB = No	WB = Yes	WB = No
Is the minimum capital entry requirement similar for local and foreign banks?	61	25	26	11
Are foreign entities allowed to enter through:				
Acquisition	90	0	33	0
Subsidiary	78	1	44	0
Branching	76	5	36	6
What kinds of securities activities can banks engage in?				
Underwriting	49	1	62	11
Dealing and Brokering	50	3	49	21
Mutual Fund Activities	30	12	59	22
Can banks engage in insurance activities?				
Underwriting	2	11	37	73
Selling	10	3	76	34

Table 8: Foreign Entry Applications and Rejection Rates

All Countries

	Countries with number of applications > 0	NA	Countries with No Applications	Total	Average Rejection Rate
Total	72	23	28	123	0.202
Acquisition	39	25	59	123	0.108
Subsidiary	43	26	54	123	0.113
Branch	43	25	55	123	0.183

Developed Nations

	Countries with number of applications > 0	NA	Countries with No Applications	Total	Average Rejection Rate
Total	20	7	2	29	0.073
Acquisition	10	6	13	29	0.050
Subsidiary	14	8	7	29	0.048
Branch	19	8	2	29	0.066

Developing Nations

	Countries with number of applications > 0	NA	Countries with No Applications	Total	Average Rejection Rate
Total	52	16	26	94	0.251
Acquisition	29	19	46	94	0.128
Subsidiary	29	18	47	94	0.144
Branch	24	17	53	94	0.276

Population > 2 million

	Countries with number of applications > 0	NA	Countries with No Applications	Total	Average Rejection Rate
Total	57	20	17	94	0.183
Acquisition	33	20	41	94	0.113
Subsidiary	31	22	41	94	0.077
Branch	35	21	38	94	0.218

Table 9: Applications and Rejection Rates Compared to Specific Commitments Regarding Foreign Entry

Table 11: Correlations Between WTO Commitments and Actual Practice

All Sample	rejectT	wb1_10_1a	wb1_10_1b	wb1_12_1	wb1_12_2	wb1_12_3	wb2_3_1	wb1_3	wb1_3_1	wb4_1_1	wb4_1_2	wb4_1_3	wb4_3_1	wb4_3_2	wb4_5_1	wb4_5_2	wb4_5_3	wb4_7	wb12_1_1	wb12_1_2	wb1_11_1	wb1_11_2	wb1_11_3	wb1_11_4	wb1_11_5	wb1_3_1
wto103	0.24**	-0.13	-0.06		-0.05	-0.03		-0.05	-0.08	-0.15	-0.17*	0.03	0.05	-0.11	0.21**	0.27***	0.2**	-0.02	0.09	-0.01	0.24**	0.21*	0.21*	0.2*	0.09	-0.08
	72	101	95	123	123	123	123	122	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	79	79	79	79	78	123
wto104	0.11	-0.15	0.2*		-0.09	0.05		-0.09	0.03	-0.18**	-0.23***	-0.07	-0.01	-0.16*	-0.02	0.1	0.04	-0.07	0.09	-0.07	-0.09	0.05	0.13	0	-0.05	0.03
	72	101	95	123	123	123	123	122	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	79	79	79	79	78	123
wto1_3_1	-0.29**	0.15	0.06		0.06	0.08		0.06	0.01	0.08	0.17*	-0.01	-0.01	0.19**	-0.19**	-0.25***	-0.14	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.15	-0.08	-0.12	-0.11	-0.12	0.01
	72	101	95	123	123	123	123	122	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	79	79	79	79	78	123
wto105	0.28**	0.01	0.12		-0.12	-0.11		-0.12	-0.13	-0.08	-0.04	0.05	0.13	-0.07	0.16*	0.13	0.04	0.14	0	0.02	0.13	0.15	0.22*	-0.02	0.06	-0.13
	72	101	95	123	123	123	123	122	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	79	79	79	79	78	123

wt2123 123 1w a028* 00062 Tc6T5002130006203215000613 0 1 13 360188938989927271014528513130623000703972291902621500 6 16165280515021212160002272924 1D01066027292832607 Tc72921632271851311729230000

wt23 744335 0o 0 T3196 01b028* 01506 01 0 T388 TD638929 10077 T2 12393 0388 TD8453 18388 TD8853 18

Table 11: Correlations Between WTO Commitments and Actual Practice (cont.)

Developed	rejectT	wb1_10_1a	wb1_10_1b	wb1_12_1	wb1_12_2	wb1_12_3	wb2_3_1	wb1_3	wb1_3_1	wb4_1_1	wb4_1_2	wb4_1_3	wb4_3_1	wb4_3_2	wb4_5_1	wb4_5_2	wb4_5_3	wb4_7	wb12_1_1	wb12_1_2	wb1_11_1	wb1_11_2	wb1_11_3	wb1_11_4	wb1_11_5	wb1_3_1
wto103																										
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto104	-0.14	-0.19	-0.08					-0.08	0.03	0.06	0.06	-0.39**	-0.29	0.09	-0.47**	-0.33*	-0.17	0.06	0.19	-0.29	-0.27	0.03	0.07	-0.27	-0.06	0.03
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto1_3_1								-0.28	0.24	-0.04	-0.04	0.37**	0.16	0.69***	0.26	0.18	0.22	-0.04	0.08	-0.22						0.24
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto105	0.19	-0.1	-0.2					0.27	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.02	0.17	-0.01	-0.17	-0.1	-0.31	-0.2	0.21	0.03	-0.12	0.15	0.05	-0.3	0.07	-0.1
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto105a	-0.17	0.12	-0.11					0.45**	-0.15	-0.31	-0.31	-0.26	-0.21	-0.14	-0.36*	-0.29	-0.42**	-0.31	0.2	0.11	0	0.26	0.11	0	0.1	-0.15
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto105b	0.33	0.07	-0.14					-0.14	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.29	0.51***	0.15	0.07	0.1	-0.02	-0.34*	0.24	-0.15	0	0.05	-0.11	-0.2	0.1	0.11
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto106								0.94***	-0.24	0.04	0.04	0.1	-0.16	0.05	0.14	-0.18	-0.22	0.04	-0.08	0.22	0.29	0.32	0.36*	-0.15	0.25	-0.24
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto107								0.94***	-0.24	0.04	0.04	0.1	-0.16	0.05	0.14	-0.18	-0.22	0.04	-0.08	0.22	0.29	0.32	0.36*	-0.15	0.25	-0.24
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto108																										
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto109																										
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto110	-0.08	-0.15	-0.07					-0.11	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.17	-0.06	0.09	0.01	-0.1	-0.17	0.06	0.19	0.17	0.11	-0.19	0.52***	-0.21	0.05	0.03
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto113d	0.1	0.16	0.07					-0.24	0.23	0.13	0.13	0.4**	0.1	0.62***	0.25	0.14	0.21	-0.05	0.02	-0.18	-0.18	-0.28	0.18	0.22	0.26	0.23
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto1_12_1		-0.11	-0.05					-0.06	0.15	0.04	0.04	0.1	0.22	0.05	0.14	0.2	0.16	0.04	-0.08	-0.16	0.29	0.32	-0.12	-0.15	-0.18	0.15
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto1_12_2	-0.08	-0.11	-0.05					0.64***	-0.07	0.05	0.05	0.14	-0.23	0.07	-0.09	-0.26	-0.32*	0.05	0.29	0.05	0.11	0.14	0.52***	-0.21	0.36*	-0.07
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto1_12_3																										
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto4_1_1	0.25	-0.04	0.16					0.11	0.15	0.31	0.31	0.07	-0.26	-0.17	0.2	-0.02	0.11	0.31	-0.42**	0.05	-0.06	-0.13	0.2	0.13	0.06	0.15
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto4_1_2	0.22	-0.09	0.14					0.09	0.22	0.34*	0.34*	0.11	-0.34*	-0.15	0.1	-0.1	0.02	0.34*	-0.24	-0.02	-0.13	-0.19	0.37*	0.06	0.17	0.22
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29
wto4_1_3	0.22	-0.04	0.16					-0.24	0.09	-0.13	-0.13	-0.16	-0.34*	-0.18	-0.02	0.05	0.19	0.28	-0.16	-0.04	-0.25	-0.32	0	0.13	-0.12	0.09
	20	24	23	29	29	29	29	28	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	24	24	24	24	24	29

Table 11: Correlations Between WTO Commitments and Actual Practice (cont.)

Developing	rejectT	wb1_10_1a	wb1_10_1b	wb1_12_1	wb1_12_2	wb1_12_3	wb2_3_1	wb1_3	wb1_3_1	wb4_1_1	wb4_1_2	wb4_1_3	wb4_3_1	wb4_3_2	wb4_5_1	wb4_5_2	wb4_5_3	wb4_7	wb12_1_1	wb12_1_2	wb1_11_1	wb1_11_2	wb1_11_3	wb1_11_4	wb1_11_5	wb1_3_1
wto103	0.21	-0.13	-0.09		-0.07	-0.09		-0.07	-0.13	-0.12	-0.12	0.07	0.1	-0.03	0.28***	0.35***	0.29***	0.02	0.1	0.05	0.28**	0.26*	0.2	0.22	0.2	-0.13
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto104	0.07	-0.14	0.2*		-0.12	-0.03		-0.12	-0.02	-0.17*	-0.18*	0.02	0.11	-0.07	0.12	0.23**	0.16	-0.04	0.07	0.05	-0.07	0.06	0.07	0.03	0.08	-0.02
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto1_3_1	-0.25*	0.15	0.1		0.08	0.15		0.08	0.02	0.05	0.11	-0.08	-0.08	0.07	-0.3***	-0.36***	-0.25**	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.18	-0.09	-0.08	-0.11	-0.28**	0.02
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto105	0.25*	0.05	0.14		-0.15	-0.17		-0.15	-0.17	-0.04	0.02	0.09	0.15	-0.03	0.29***	0.22**	0.19*	0.24**	-0.07	0.05	0.23*	0.16	0.25*	0.07	0.14	-0.17
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto105a	0.35**	-0.17	0.18		-0.11	-0.12		-0.11	-0.23**	-0.08	-0.09	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.23**	0.23**	0.12	0.12	-0.06	-0.04	0.12	0.15	0.19	0.16	0.23*	-0.23**
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto105b	0.14	0.08	-0.12		-0.12	-0.15		-0.12	-0.04	0.01	-0.1	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.34***	0.26**	0.28***	0.15	0.03	0.07	0.32**	0.21	0.24*	0.05	0.12	-0.04
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto106	0.14	-0.17	-0.13		-0.08	-0.02		-0.08	-0.11	-0.05	-0.05	0.1	0.11	0.08	0.23**	0.29***	0.23**	-0.05	0.07	-0.07	0.13	0.12	0.04	0.06	0.38***	-0.11
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto107	0.05	-0.15	-0.15		-0.09	-0.05		-0.09	-0.12	-0.02	-0.01	0.14	0.17	0	0.29***	0.37***	0.3***	-0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.07	0.15	0.13	0.07	0.33**	-0.12
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto108	0.11	-0.15	-0.09		-0.09	0.08		-0.09	-0.15	-0.08	-0.05	0.1	0.06	0.1	0.14	0.17*	0.15	0.05	0.09	-0.07	0.12	0.2	0.09	0.04	0.3**	-0.15
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto109	0.17	-0.16	-0.12		-0.08	-0.07		-0.08	-0.1	-0.07	-0.09	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.26**	0.31***	0.25**	0	0.03	-0.03	0.17	0.15	0.08	0.1	0.3**	-0.1
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto110	-0.19	-0.01	-0.1		-0.04	-0.13		-0.04	0.05	0.13	0.2*	-0.08	-0.14	0.05	-0.02	-0.15	-0.09	-0.09	0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.02	-0.07	-0.18	-0.03	0.05
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto113d	0.05	-0.22*	-0.05		-0.05	0		-0.02	-0.11	-0.14	-0.12	0.1	0.12	-0.05	0.12	0.23*	0.2*	0.13	0.1	-0.06	0.05	0.21	0.22	0.27*	-0.07	-0.11
	44	65	61	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	73	46	46	46	46	45	73
wto1_12_1	0.09	-0.11	-0.11		-0.07	-0.12		-0.08	-0.13	-0.16	-0.11	0.08	0.04	-0.05	0.22**	0.26**	0.2*	-0.02	0.05	-0.01	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.1	0.2	-0.13
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto1_12_2	0.09	-0.1	0.06		-0.09	0.01		-0.09	-0.23**	-0.14	-0.04	0.07	-0.05	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.05	-0.01	0.13	-0.08	-0.08	0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.24*	-0.23**
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto1_12_3	0.07	-0.17	-0.14		0.12	0.07		-0.09	0.01	-0.07	-0.28***	0.02	-0.05	0.03	0.29***	0.33***	0.27***	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	0.1	0.09	0	0.03	0.28**	0.01
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto4_1_1	-0.13	0.01	0.28**		-0.07	0.04		-0.07	-0.07	0.17*	0.22**	-0.07	-0.07	0.13	-0.2**	-0.28***	-0.2*	0.1	-0.04	-0.18*	-0.21	-0.12	-0.16	-0.21	0.16	-0.07
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto4_1_2	-0.12	-0.01	0.26**		-0.07	-0.04		-0.07	-0.09	0.19*	0.24**	-0.04	-0.1	0.12	-0.2**	-0.27***	-0.15	0.04	-0.06	-0.05	-0.13	-0.03	-0.11	-0.15	0.1	-0.09
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94
wto4_1_3	-0.18	0.01	0.16		-0.06	0.03		-0.06	-0.07	0.2*	0.31***	-0.02	-0.02	0.11	-0.04	-0.21**	-0.07	0.2*	0.03	-0.15	-0.07	0	-0.16	-0.14	-0.01	-0.07
	52	77	72	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	55	55	55	55	54	94

Table 11: Correlations Between WTO Commitments and Actual Practice (cont.)

Population > 2 Million	rejectT	wb1_10_1a	wb1_10_1b	wb1_12_1	wb1_12_2	wb1_12_3	wb2_3_1	wb1_3	wb1_3_1	wb4_1_1	wb4_1_2	wb4_1_3	wb4_3_1	wb4_3_2	wb4_5_1	wb4_5_2	wb4_5_3	wb4_7	wb12_1_1	wb12_1_2	wb1_11_1	wb1_11_2	wb1_11_3	wb1_11_4	wb1_11_5	wb1_3_1
wto103	0.17	-0.07	0		-0.04	-0.13		-0.04	0.22**	-0.12	-0.18*	0.06	-0.04	-0.2*	0.24**	0.3***	0.27***	0.13	-0.15	0.09	0.28**	0.09	0.17	0.25**	-0.04	0.22**
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto104	0.11	-0.12	0.27**		-0.08	0.04		-0.08	0.18*	-0.19*	-0.26**	-0.11	-0.05	-0.18*	-0.02	0.06	0.06	-0.04	-0.08	-0.06	-0.09	0.03	0.14	0.07	-0.11	0.18*
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto1_3_1	-0.3**	0.11	0.01		0.06	0.17*		0.06	-0.24**	0.04	0.18*	-0.01	0.1	0.31***	-0.24**	-0.29***	-0.2*	-0.09	0.2*	-0.05	-0.18	0.04	-0.1	-0.15	-0.07	-0.24**
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto105	0.26**	0.07	0.16		-0.12	-0.15		-0.12	-0.03	0	-0.02	0.04	0.16	-0.08	0.27***	0.2*	0.12	0.22**	-0.15	-0.01	0.17	0.15	0.2	-0.04	0.09	-0.03
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto105a	0.25*	-0.09	0.26**		-0.09	-0.13		-0.09	-0.04	-0.01	-0.11	0.03	-0.04	-0.05	0.17	0.1	0	0.13	-0.11	-0.01	0.09	0.15	0.19	0.11	0.16	-0.04
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto105b	0.25*	0.14	-0.09		-0.09	-0.13		-0.09	0.21**	-0.01	-0.17	0.08	0.11	-0.05	0.3***	0.27***	0.22**	0.13	-0.11	-0.06	0.23*	0.08	0.12	-0.03	0	0.21**
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto106	0.12	-0.13	-0.06		-0.06	-0.01		-0.06	0.13	-0.03	-0.1	0.09	-0.06	-0.07	0.15	0.16	0.12	0.01	-0.12	-0.02	0.14	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.21	0.13
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto107	0.06	-0.12	-0.08		-0.06	-0.02		-0.06	0.09	-0.02	-0.07	0.11	-0.03	-0.19*	0.19*	0.21**	0.17*	0.02	-0.14	0.01	0.1	0.1	0.21	0.07	0.18	0.09
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto108	0.1	-0.11	-0.01		-0.06	0.13		-0.06	0.16	-0.1	-0.12	0.08	-0.05	-0.07	0.07	0.09	0.05	0.11	-0.07	-0.12	0.01	0	0.03	-0.02	0.08	0.16
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto109	0.14	-0.12	-0.06		-0.05	-0.07		-0.05	0.22**	-0.06	-0.14	0.04	-0.07	-0.12	0.2*	0.23**	0.2*	0.07	-0.18*	-0.03	0.12	-0.02	0.03	0.09	0.07	0.22**
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto110	-0.09	-0.05	-0.09		-0.04	-0.11		-0.04	-0.05	0.1	0.17*	0	-0.14	0.01	-0.03	-0.07	-0.09	-0.12	0.09	0.01	0.1	0.05	0.11	-0.14	-0.07	-0.05
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto113d	0	-0.18	0.01		-0.02	0.04		0.01	0.14	-0.15	-0.21*	-0.02	-0.05	-0.01	-0.03	0.06	0.06	0.09	-0.15	-0.02	0.12	0.17	0.18	0.31**	0	0.14
	53	70	66	81	81	81	81	80	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	58	58	58	58	57	81
wto1_12_1	0.05	-0.07	-0.05		-0.05	-0.16		-0.05	0.21**	-0.17*	-0.16	0.08	-0.06	-0.2*	0.18*	0.21**	0.17*	0.07	-0.18*	-0.01	0.18	0.06	0.1	0.05	-0.06	0.21**
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto1_12_2	0.08	-0.07	0.16		-0.07	0.03		-0.07	-0.02	-0.17	-0.08	0.07	-0.19*	-0.12	-0.01	-0.02	-0.06	0.05	-0.02	-0.05	-0.07	-0.05	0.1	-0.04	0.05	-0.02
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto1_12_3	0.03	-0.13	-0.07		0.17	0.12		-0.07	0.29***	-0.1	-0.4***	-0.01	-0.22**	-0.15	0.19*	0.22**	0.18*	0.04	-0.23**	-0.02	0.05	-0.07	-0.03	0.02	0.04	0.29***
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto4_1_1	-0.05	-0.04	0.21*		-0.1	-0.01		-0.1	-0.25**	0.26**	0.36***	0.04	-0.04	0.24**	-0.1	-0.19*	-0.08	0.15	-0.07	-0.11	-0.21*	-0.12	-0.04	-0.14	0.28**	-0.25**
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto4_1_2	0	-0.04	0.21*		-0.1	-0.08		-0.1	-0.25**	0.26**	0.36***	0.04	-0.09	0.2*	-0.1	-0.19*	-0.08	0.08	-0.07	-0.06	-0.17	-0.06	0	-0.1	0.26**	-0.25**
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94
wto4_1_3	-0.16	-0.04	0.08		-0.08	-0.04		-0.08	-0.22**	0.15	0.35***	0	-0.01	0.21**	0	-0.09	0.04	0.26**	0.05	-0.08	-0.19	-0.11	-0.16	-0.11	0.08	-0.22**
	57	76	72	94	94	94	94	93	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	94	63	63	63	63	62	94

Country	Degree of Openness		Degree of Discrimination			
	All components	Omit rejection rate	Actual Practice	Commitments		

Country	Degree of Openness				Degree of Discrimination					
	All components		Omit rejection rate		Actual Practice		Commitments		Domestic	Foreign
	Actual Practice	Commitments	Actual Practice	Commitments	Domestic	Foreign	Domestic	Foreign		

Country	Degree of Openness				Degree of Discrimination					
	All components		Omit rejection rate		Actual Practice		Commitments		Domestic	Foreign
	Actual Practice	Commitments	Actual Practice	Commitments	Domestic	Foreign	Domestic	Foreign		
Trinidad and Tobago	0.396	0.900	0.396	0.700	0.150	0.496	0.400	1.000	0.350	0.733
Tunisia	0.163	0.650	0.163	0.600	0.050	0.263	0.250	0.750	0.100	0.350
Turkey	0.163	0.150	0.113	0.100	0.050	0.213	0.150	0.200	0.050	0.100
United Arab Emirates		0.466	0.175	0.416			0.250	0.466	0.150	0.300
United Kingdom		0.100	0.075	0.100			0.100	0.100	0.000	0.000
United States	0.113	0.200	0.113	0.200	0.000	0.213	0.200	0.300	0.000	0.100
Uruguay	0.225	0.250	0.075	0.200	0.150	0.225	0.250	0.250	0.050	0.050
Venezuela	0.275	0.250	0.275	0.200	0.200	0.325	0.250	0.300	0.250	0.300
Zimbabwe		0.325	0.108	0.325			0.175	0.325	0.000	0.033

[redacted]

Table 13: Correlations Between Commitments and Potential Factors that Explain the Commitments Made

All Countries	wb3_8_1	wb3_8_2	GDP	GDPcap	NPL	NIM

Table 13: Correlations Between Commitments and Potential Factors that Explain the Commitments Made (cont)

Population> 2 Million	wb3_8_1	wb3_8_2	GDP	GDPcap	NPL	NIM	ConDepo	ConAssset	BnkDev	Laws	Corrupt	wb1_1_1	wb1_1_2	wb8_1