

The unprecedented surge of preferential trade liberalization since World War II can be explained by theoretical and empirical work that has shown that the theoretical effects of trade liberalization are large and positive. The theoretical literature has shown that trade liberalization induces welfare gains for participating countries. The empirical literature has shown that trade liberalization has had a significant positive impact on economic growth and political development. The theoretical literature has also shown that trade liberalization can lead to a more efficient allocation of resources and a more dynamic economy. The empirical literature has also shown that trade liberalization has led to a significant increase in the number of trade agreements and a significant increase in the number of trade agreements. The theoretical literature has also shown that trade liberalization can lead to a more efficient allocation of resources and a more dynamic economy. The empirical literature has also shown that trade liberalization has led to a significant increase in the number of trade agreements and a significant increase in the number of trade agreements.

and fifteen empirical research in international economics: first, the empirical evidence on general equilibrium models of the trade cycle is all available and effective (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2002; Anderson and Wincoop 2003; Anderson 2009); second, each nation in bilateral trade may have a comparative advantage that can be modeled explicitly in empirical analysis (see Santos Silva and Teneyre 2006; 2008; and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein 2008); third, the literature on endogenous trade and health effects (see Ales and Egand 2002; 2007; 2009),² increasingly have been largely important health effects that are usually unexplained.

This paper examines trade membership and endogenous trade membership in the empirical model and the impact of the bilateral and multilateral effects of endogenous trade in the unification of trade effects. In contrast to preceding work by Anderson and Tamura (1994), Santos Silva and Teneyre (2006-2008) and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) on all (binary) dependent variables, we endogenous trade participation. In particular, we use empirical model based on pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation in the endogenous (binary) explanatory variable.

We apply the endogenous trade cycle model of bilateral trade and health dependent variables. The binary trade membership indicator for the year 2005. We compare the trade membership and compare the unexplained predicted trade membership in the trade general equilibrium. Limiting trade membership and health membership directly but in an indirect effect. In addition, though the impact of trade membership on price, consumption, and D.

Our finding may be summarized as follows. The evidence highlights the potential

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bia e a cia ed i h he ign ance f he h ee men i ned i ue : gene al e uilib ium
 (hi d-c un y) effec f TA membe hip; ze in ade ma ice ; and he end genei y
 f TA . The bia e a e f diffe en magni ude h ugh F in ance a l g-linea m del
 f exp hich ign e gene al e uilib ium effec n p f he he p blem lead a
 bia f -73 pe cen age p in -66% ela ive he p efe able -pa χ^2 , app ach
 A ne-pa χ^2 i n p eud -maximum likelih d (χ^2 ,) m del hich di ega d n n-
 and m elec i n in p i ive exp and ea TA membe hip a ex gen u lead
 a bia f he impac f TA n membe ' ela ive n nmembe ' ade by -56
 pe cen age p in -51% ela ive a -pa χ^2 , m del hich c pe i h all f he
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 bu di ega d he p blem f an exce ive numbe f ze in he da a lead a d n a d
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The emainde f he pape i ganized a f ll . The nex ec i n b iefly in duce
 he bila e al ade fl m del e ill ely up n Sec i n 3 p in u h ee p blem i h
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 e ima i n e ul he e f Sec i n 7 c mpu e he impac f TA membe hip a b e ved
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 ec i n c nclude i h a umma y f he m imp an finding .

Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive a general representation in bilateral aggregate minimal trade flows in the ad hoc model of the neoclassical and competitive. Further research includes the work of Anderson (1979) and Rugman (1980) in the literature. The framework can be briefly introduced as follows. Let us denote minimal export and import functions (in the form of $1 - \alpha$) by x and y and define the corresponding import and export functions x^* and y^* . Finally, let u and v be the export and import demand functions (in the form of $1 - \beta$) respectively. Then, the minimal bilateral export and import functions are defined as

$$x = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \Pi^{-1} \quad (1)$$

where Π is the elasticity of substitution in manufacturing (varian) and Π^{-1} is called the import and export functions respectively. \bullet R is the effective multilateral (non-linearly weighted) average firm export and import functions in an importing country are faced. In empirically, the \bullet R -terms are derived but they can be readily derived as follows. Let e be the

$$\Pi^{-1} = \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \right); \quad \Pi^{-1} = \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \right) \quad (2)$$

The usual representation of the model is based on the usual advance in the reduced-form (i; j)

...].” Since pillow effect from uncertainty
 paid the average healthy head of the market a full account of the impact of
 cost [TA membership in general equilibrium need the peculiar effect
 on all variables in the high-hand side of (1): the average of () in
 () implies D_{L}^{P} () and D_{L}^{P} () respectively (ince they are a function
 of the flow) and the expected and implied \bullet Rem (II and) respectively.
 Notice that the direct effect of average generally dampened by the \bullet Rem a
 illustrated in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).

Since direct measure of efficiency is not available, the proxy
 variables are the bilateral distance between countries' capital () ac-
 count in the national budget indicator () and the official language indicator
 () as typical examples. \llcorner In the empirical model of bilateral trade
 policy, it is added as an element of by including an indicator variable for effe-
 ctive trade agreements membership (). The commonly adopted assumption is
 the elasticity has been and the proxy variable is

$$^1 \exp(\beta_1 \ln \text{ } + \beta_2 \text{ } + \beta_3 \text{ } + \text{ }) \quad (3)$$

Substituting (3) in (1) we obtain the multiplicative model

$$\exp(\beta_1 \ln \text{ } + \beta_2 \text{ } + \beta_3 \text{ }) \quad (4)$$

where $(1 \ln \text{ })$ is a vector containing a constant and all average
 trade facilitation variables except . Generally binary variables such as
 membership in and continuity variables such as membership in (3).
 \bullet The vector $(\beta_0 \beta_1 \beta_2 \beta_3)$ is a vector of coefficients depending on the elements in
 . $\ln(\Pi$

This is each of the unmet needs of TA membership not only affect the
paid variable expenses but the net cost of membership. The latter feature is added
to the budget in the annual financial statement of the Ande

variable capturing political affiliation impediments bilateral trade liberalization; country size and relative factor endowments; and proximity to the global market. We classify countries as belonging to a common region if they have active trade agreements with the World Trade Organization. The data are augmented and corrected by using information from the country's website and they are compiled by using a binary dummy variable reflecting WTO membership for the year 2005. The heterogeneity variable contains the following elements:

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c un ie have a c mm n language and ze el e (AN); an indica va iable
 hich i e ne if c un ie a el ca ed a he ame c n inen and ze el e
 (NT); an indica va iable hich i e ne if ne f c un ie had been
 a c l ny f he he in he pa and ze el e (N); an indica va iable
 hich i e ne if ne f c un ie had been a c l ny f he he af e he yea
 1945 and ze el e (R); an indica va iable hich i e ne if ne f
 c un ie had a c mm n c l nize in he pa and ze el e (•); an indica-
 va iable hich i e ne if ne c un y a pa f he he in he pa and
 ze el e (S TR). All f he men i ned ade c indica a e aken f m he
 ge g aphical da aba e p vided by he en e d' ude [p e c i v e e d n f m a i n
 c n e n a i n a l e ([<). The li f va iable in aie and e g and (2004) did n in-
 clude (c un y dummie and) ST². AN N R •
 S TR . We nly include a ub e f he e va iable in he exp u c me
 e ua i n ince he he ne d n di play a ignifican di ec impac n exp .¹²

c n me f he ec n me ic m del applied he e elec i n in p i v e exp ha
 a cha ic c mp nen and i he i e de e mined by a func i n f a c mple e e f
 exp e and imp e dummy va iable and he f ll ing e f e g e : he [TA
 indica va iable; l g bila e al di ance be een c un ie ' capi al (ST); he
 af emen i ned c mm n language indica (AN); and an indica va iable hich i
 e ne if c un ie have a c mm n land b de and ze el e (RD).¹³ When-
 eve b h elec i n in p i v e exp and in [TA a e p e c i f i e d in he men i ned
 ay e m del he p p e e a a e c u i v e b i v a i a e p b i m del

Finally in u applica i n e include he f ll ing ade c va iable in in he
 n minal exp u c me e ua i n (5): ST RD and AN . he i e n mi-

nal exp a e a func i n f a c mple e e f exp e and imp e dummy va iable.¹⁴
 and f (p en ially end gen u) TA . Da a n bila e al exp in n minal .S d lla
 a e c llec ed f m he ni ed Na i n' W ld T ade Da aba e

Table 1

Table 1 umma ize mean anda d devia i n minimum and maximum f he di -
 ibu i n f he dependen and independen va iable empl yed in he e ima ed m del .
 He e e uld like empha ize ha ab u 37 pe cen f he cell f he bila e al ex -
 p ma ix a e ze and ab u 22 pe cen f he 15 750 c un y-pai in u da a- e
 a e membe f a c mm n TA.

F an a e men f he effec f TA membe hip n ade fl i i nece a y
 b ain c ni en e ima e f he unkn n pa ame e vec and he TA pa ame e
 f in e e . H e ve d e nly eflec di ec effec f TA membe hip n exp .
 T uan ify al effec – hich al acc un f feedback ac c un ie c ni en i h
 gene al e uilib ium – e need c mpu e c un e fac ual exp i h u TA membe -
 hip The la e al acc un f he impac f TA membe hip n D and R e m
 a explained in Sec i n 2 We ill uan ify he impac f TA membe hip by c mpa -
 ing p edic ed exp f TA in ide i h TA a f 2005 ela ive u ide i h
 p edic ed ela ive ade fl in a c un e fac ual cena i i h u any TA . While hi
 end i exemplified in Sec i n 7 u bjec ive in he ub e uen ec i n i c ni en ly
 e ima e and .

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Since the parameter β in the model (5) are β_1 and β_2 and β_3 can be considered
 a nuisance parameter from an econometric point of view. The model being estimated
 has a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables.
 The effect of D and R may depend on the continuous specific factor β .
 The appropriate econometric method used depends on the assumption on the rela-
 tionship between β and the regressors and β . If β is independent
 of D and R , and the effect remains to be consistent and efficient. However,
 an independence is precluded by the underlying econometric model which suggests
 that β depends on D and R .

the variance of the estimator $\hat{\beta}$ is given by (8) for the generalized likelihood ratio test and $\hat{\beta}$. A consequence of applying the procedure described above have been adjusted according to the variance of the estimator $\hat{\beta}$.¹⁸

Since the aim of this section is to apply the aforementioned method to the parameter needed in the impact function of the TA membership function, while all the other parameters in the data-generating process are known,

The result in Table 2 suggests the following conclusion. First, all the indicators in the indicator set based on the above-mentioned variables provide evidence favoring the hypothesis that firms with a high level of financial performance in the industry have a positive effect on the dependent variable. Hence, particularly the high-performance firms display a high level of financial performance in the industry. Notice that the indicator in the hypothesis is in the industry and the regression (2004) according to which the industry exhibits the highest performance gain in the industry would be (and a) large.

Second, the evidence for the dependent variable, and given by the F -test, can be attributed to a simple linear regression (called) the relationship between the industry and the change in the expected F -test. The industry in the regression model is the dependent variable. We find that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 level. We find that the regression coefficient is negative and significant in the regression model. ²⁰ A negative indicator is a variable (i.e., factor) that has a negative impact on the dependent variable. This negative effect on the dependent variable leads to a downward bias in the estimated parameter: The parameter of the F -test indicates a downward bias in the F -test. This is due to the S -test, and N - S is usually the major difference across columns of F -test, and N - S is especially affected by the parameter of the F -test. The remaining parameter is fairly similar across columns. However, the regression coefficient is likely to be F -test, and N - S is the F -test. It is known that F -test is preferable to N - S according to the discussion in Santos Silva and Teney (2006) and Section 5.1 above.

The result from the binomial test of the reduced form of the F -test suggests the following conclusion. The political variable is not a significant determinant

Among the effects of cultural, geographical and political indicators, the net effect of common language (AN) and Net is statistically insignificant. The effect of AN on [TA membership in 1998 in] (agee' (2003) application is positive and insignificant. However, Net and AN are able to form aie and eg and' (2004) model. However, we find a statistically significant effect of a positive influence if countries are in the same continent (NT) (countries in the aie and eg and 2004) if they had a common language. • if net of them a a c l ny f he he af e 1945 R

f ze ade fl in he de e mini ic pa f he m del We ill d

imila ela i n hip a he ne u ed bef e

$$(\quad \quad \quad \mathbb{I} \quad 1) \quad \Psi \quad \quad \quad (18)$$

he e and Ψ a e anal g u he exp e i n in (9). H eve n e ha a hi
 func i nal f m i n a umed h ld f p i ve exp e nly and n f all be -
 va i n a in (8)-(9) he pa ame e and in (18) d n den e he ame uan i ie
 a in he m del f Sec i n 5

e u n u n he fi pa f he m del he p babil y f c un y e ve
 c un y via exp a all F hi pu p e he m del f \mathbb{I} a defined by e ua i n
 (11) i an la ed in a cha ic p ce

$$\mathbb{I} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ if} \\ \end{array} \right.$$

he e Φ_2

ive e a the level f he u c me e ua i n and i ef mula i n a mul iplica ive
e e up i n ivial a ac abili y f he m del elie pa ially n he addi ivi y
a ump i n The -pa m del n he he hand a een ab ve lend i elf ea ily
a gene aliza i n i h a c mm n end gen u bina y va iable in b h pa .lea ly
he e ea n a e n ub an ive bu hey h uld n be d nplayed ei he e pecially
in la ge- cale applica i n a he p e en ne²³

and of the leading volume

... the independence assumption about the part of the model. This might underestimate the impact of the independence of the decision in the ... (i.e. - in u ... pecific in - affect ... mic de ... and any imp ... exp ... pecific the ... end ... elec in in ... ade in end gen u ... ade volume in an empirical ... depend ... and ... We ... im' (2006) ... empirically ... the hyp ... elec in in u ... The formal ... failed ... independence of the decision ... ade f m the ... ading volume²⁵

The effect of the ... approach may ... defend ... the ... of the collective force of the ... all ... the absence of compelling empirical evidence ... been the part of the model in u ... applica in T ... be clear ... again ... the use of elec in m del in ... general ... a ... ing ... -pa m del ... be ... ade m del. ... in the ... be ...

... the ... the ... and N S m del ... de ... in Sec in 6.2 ... Table 2 ... Table 4 ... the ... e ... e ... f ... f u ... al ... m del ... bil ... al exp ... in ... (...). Again ... y ... pai ... lumn ... give ... the ... f ... u ... c ... va ... ia ... e ... f ... in ... e ... in the exp ... u -

come e ua i n - [TA, ST, RD, and AN] e n e di ingui h be een
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 p i ive value f exp . The f me hu dle p ce i cap u ed by a p bi m del f
 II a explained in Sec i n 6.2 hile he la e i e ima ed via [TA]. The fi pai f
 c lumn c lumn f u give he pa ame e i h b h [TA], and N S hen
 ea ing [TA] a ex gen u. < n he ec nd pai f c lumn c lumn five even e
 ea [TA] a end gen u. The e e a ume ha he p ce e de e mining [TA] and
 II may be cap u ed by a ecu ive biva ia e p bi m del f b h [TA], and N S

Table 4

Simila he e ul in Table 2 e find ha he p in e ima e f [TA] inc ea e
 a e aband n he a ump i n f [TA] be ex gen u. Again hi e ul h ld ue
 f b h [TA], and N S. The p in e ima e f he ne-pa and -pa m del
 a e ela ively imila each he in b ad e m. H eve, me diffe ence emain
 ugge ing ha ze exp a e n gene a ed in ufficien magni ude by he [TA].
 N Sem del We-pa x g

which is reflected in the vote in favor of the impact of TA on the decision made when negotiating endogeneity. A similar effect is shown in Table 4, suggesting that affecting endogeneity of TA membership has an impact on the incentive margin but does not significantly affect the executive margin of funds. Such a result could be in accordance with the hypothesis that a sufficiently high market-specific fixed entry cost which is unaffected by TA formation in the equilibrium delivery cost is affected by TA membership. Nevertheless, the fact that the estimated elasticity is not significantly different from zero is not completely surprising in the general specification of the model. The different elasticity suggests that affecting economic and political determinants of executive and incentive margin of funds may appear to be driven by the general factor. The finding beyond that point could be purely speculative, as we have leave it as is.

Table 5

Table 5 summarizes the effect of the bivariate probability in favor of TA entry on the number of units that the efficient manager always imitates. The results are similar to the univariate probability in Table 3. The parameter estimates in the model which are reported in the executive margin of funds are reported in Table 4.

We will illustrate the importance of considering both self-election in TA and the expected payoff by means of a counterfactual analysis. In particular, we will compute the impact of TA membership observed in the year 2005 on the number of TA

e ima f Abadie and Imbens (2006) for the year 2000; implying an effect of about 97%) and 2.36 (using the same approach for the year 1990). While the estimates lie in a similar range as the net reported in previous work and acknowledge non-linear effects of trade a possible decomposition of TA formation in accumulation, they do not consider non-linear general equilibrium effects of TA expansion, Ales and Eg and (2007) acknowledge general equilibrium effects in a panel data about a sample of TA membership in exchange. However, the average treatment effects from the period model are still very close to the counterfactual endogenous treatment effects in the more recent paper. Using 0.62 (implying an effect of about 86%) and 0.54 (implying an effect of about 72%). Relative to Ales and Eg and 'Agee' (2003) estimates of TA-effects on average employment: they are about 300 percent and 800 percent! However, the estimates do not account for fixed country effects in both the outcome equation and the TA equation.

Unlike previous work, our identification of TA effects on average general equilibrium effects, account for the differential impact of TA on the extensive and intensive margins of export and each TA endogenously. Finally, the overall importance of the findings has not been fully faced in the debate about TA effects on trade: has it been favored in aiff are the endogenous variables? TA membership does not being about identical aiff education across country-pairs (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2002 for a treatment of aiff effects in the general equilibrium model).

Setting up in the identification are the parameters estimated in Table 2 and 4. Note that the findings do not need rely on any specific underlying model. The estimates on the leading economic specifications for the parameters of the model are in a perfectly consistent with the identification strategy. ²⁶ Specifically, it captures the net effect of the high-value-added and high-magnitude firm à la Lugman (1980) the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) exchange economy the Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) model allowing for firm heterogeneity.

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genei y and ze ade fl he a n and um (2002) Rica dian m del and he
• eli z and avian (2008) m del i h ua i-linea uad a ic p efe ence and end ge-
n u ma k-up. H eve if ne an g fu he and un a c un e fac ual analy i i

al e he e gene u a iff and (in Table 6b).

Table 6a and 6b

≤ n a nu hell he figu e in he able ugge he f ll ing c nclu i n . Fi ... ade
am ng TA membe inc ea e due p efe en ial a iff ab li i n F in ance he
PP, m del hich a ume ex gen u TA f ma i n n pecific p ce f he ex en-
ive ma gin exp and n he e gene u a iff effec n ade and D in he uppe
lef c ne f he able p in an inc ea e in n minal exp am ng TA membe ela-
ive n nmembe by 54% ela ive an e uilib ium i h u any TA . Thi i effec ed
in he numbe hich i given in he u e lef c lumn a he p f Table 6a labeled
' . The

PP, -ba ed effec i ab u 45 pe cen age p in highe i h end gen u TA f ma i n
(ab u 99% highe exp am ng TA membe ela ive n nmembe han i h u
TA ; ee he e ul in he hi d c lumn a he p f Table 6a). ≤ gn ing he he e -
genei y f a iff b ing ab u a negligible bia in u applica i n³⁰ T ee he la e .
c mpa e he e ul a he p f Table 6a i h he c e p nding ne in Table 6b

• deling he p ce f end gen u elec i n in p i ive exp epa a e f m he
n n-linea p ce f p i ive exp i ela ively imp an .≤ ai e he p edic ed effec
f TA f ma i n i h end gen u TA n in ide ' ade ela ive he c un y-pai
- in he p efe ed PP, m del in he even h c lumn f Table 6a by ab u 11 pe cen age
p in f m ab u 99% 110% f he ave age TA-induced effec n exp f 110%
ab u 10 pe cen a e c n ibu ed by he ex en ive ma gin hile he e i due he
in en ive ma gin ≤ n gene al he c n ibu i n he ave age TA-induced effec n

• The variables in Table 6a and 6b indicate the impact of non-union TA effects on the dependent variable. It has been determined from the preliminary regression analysis that the variables in effect are not significantly related. ³² These findings indicate the overall effect in the population of Table 6a and 6b. The effect of union membership on the dependent variable is the percentage change in the bilateral export bill for TA members (the percentage of each variable) and all other non-members (the average of each variable): the mean and standard deviation in the minimum and maximum effect of each model ³³ is a measure of the model's ability to explain the variation in the dependent variable. The regression coefficients for TA members and non-members which exceed the average effect. The variables in the effect are directly due to the relevance of the regression coefficient in general equilibrium. Hence, the underlying theoretical model suggests that the average effect of TA membership is only the average. The overall even positive effect from the simultaneous implementation of TA in the domestic market of TA members (accounting for the direct effect of foreign TA). Similarly, the average even TA non-members which gain from the simultaneous implementation of foreign TA. TA members face positive and TA non-members negative effect of TA formation in the dependent variable.

Although the above findings suggest that the empirical model is 38668()-406962(6)-25323(i)-142378

a theoretical and an empirical perspective. First, proposed models principally all find a dip in the number of zero-inflated endogenous TA membership which previously proposed evidence is largely unconvincing (and accordingly not only in the case of the second proposed model all find evidence which fully accounts for the general equilibrium effect of TA membership on the dependent variable and ultimately the general equilibrium effect of TA formation. Finally, even the proposed microeconomic model (which appears to be a convincing one) did not have the feature

This paper presents a non-linear econometric technique for the analysis of the policy effect on bilateral trade which is unique in the literature:

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azil unei ulgă ia u undi ame n anada hile hina l mbia m
a Rica e d v i e a ia yp u zech Republic Denma k cuad gyp
l Salvad nia hi pia Fiji Finland F ance e gia e many hana eece

Australia New Zealand Economic Relations Trade Agreement (R) Chile and
 the Republic of Chile and El Salvador Chile and Mexico Economic Independence
 South East Free Trade Agreement (SEFTA) Economic Cooperation and Southern Africa
 (ECSA) Africa and Albania Africa and Nigeria and Hezegvina Africa and
 FR Yugoslavia African Community Treaty (A) Eurasian Economic Commu-
 nity (A) European Community (EC) and Algeria and Bulgaria and
 Chile and Africa and Guyana and FR Yugoslavia and Iceland
 and Israel and Jordan and Lebanon and Mexico and Morocco and
 Norway Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and Romania and South
 Africa and Switzerland and Liechtenstein and Syria and Tunisia and
 Turkey Agreement on the European Economic Area (A) European Free Trade A-
 reas (FTA) FTA and Bulgaria FTA and Chile FTA and Africa FTA
 and FR Yugoslavia FTA and Israel FTA and Jordan FTA and Mexico FTA
 and Morocco FTA and Romania FTA and Singapore FTA and Tunisia FTA and
 Turkey FR Yugoslavia and Nigeria and Hezegvina The unified Economic Agreement
 between the independent states of the former Soviet Union (CIS) Georgia and Armenia
 Georgia and Azerbaijan Georgia and Russian Federation Georgia and Turkmenistan
 and Uzbekistan and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) India and
 Sri Lanka Israel and Turkey Japan and Mexico Japan and Singapore and Kyrgyz Republic
 and Armenia and Kyrgyz Republic and Azerbaijan and Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova and Kyrgyz
 Republic and Russian Federation and the Americas and the Caribbean

Development Community (SAD) South Asian Africa in the Regional Partnership
 Preferential Trading Arrangements (SAFTA) Singapore and Australia South Pacific Re-
 gional Trade and Economic Partnership Agreements (SPART-A) Thailand and Au-
 stralia TRIPS Tukey and India and Hezevin Tukey and Asia Tukey
 and FRACED India India and Chile India and Korea India and
 and India India and Singapore India and Australia Trade Development
 Initiative Economic Partnership Africa (WAFPA).

Table 3: β bi e ima i n e ul f educed f m e ua i n f β TA

	eff	S d e .
D RA	0 0059	0 0030
D RA ²	-0 0001	0 0000
β , β	-0 1083	0 0133
β , β ²	0 0011	0 0001
A T	0 0737	0 0155
A T ²	-0 0007	0 0002
β ST		

Table 4: β -pa gavi y m del f ade

(1)	β (II) (1) (2)	β (II) (1) (3)	β (II) (1) (4)	β (II) (1) (5)	β (II) (1) (6)	β (II) (1) (7)
β TA	0.3647 (0.0555)	0.4789 (0.0626)	0.6215 (0.1001)	-0.0879 (0.1116)	0.7690 (0.1243)	0.8789 (0.2049)
β ST	-1.1950 (0.0384)	-0.7023 (0.0296)	0.5921 (0.0755)	-1.2736 (0.0410)	-0.6269 (0.0417)	-0.5603 (0.0569)
RD	-0.4388 (0.1681)	0.6589 (0.0632)	-0.6262 (0.0398)	-0.3120 (0.1679)	0.6563 (0.0619)	0.5642 (0.0714)
AN	0.6415 (0.0629)	0.2164 (0.0644)	0.2531 (0.0815)	0.6180 (0.0627)	0.2464 (0.0620)	0.2846 (0.0801)
$\hat{\alpha}$	-	-	-	0.3012 (0.0637)	-	-
$\hat{\alpha}$	-	-	-	-	-0.2028 (0.0843)	-0.1754 (0.1271)
Number of observations	13500	9891	9891	15750	9891	9891
Number of clusters	126	126	126	126	126	126

Notes:

Table 5: iva ia e p bi e ima i n e ul f TA

Table 6a: un e fac ual e ul h m gen u a iff a e

	ne-pa m del				T -pa m del			
	x gen u TA		nd gen u TA		x gen u TA		nd gen u TA	
	[[[. N S	[[[. N S	[[[. N S	[[[. N S				
Ave age pe cen age inc ea e f ade fl								
f TA membe in exce f n n-membe	54 27	74 33	98 66	120 10	63 01	83 98	110 07	129 45
Δ am ng TA membe in %:								
mean	20 0853	27 4616	34 3624	42 1099	18 3858	25 3532	31 9194	38 4637
d dev.	20 8203	28 7353	37 1613	45 9208	19 1919	26 7205	34 7583	42 1930
min	-31 0661	-38 0643	-45 2417	-50 1009	-30 7348	-37 9412	-45 3082	-49 7424
max	89 0851	128 2430	174 0078	222 9863	82 1443	115 3547	156 3760	189 3391
# f TA membe pai i h								
p i ive effec	2734	2735	2710	2713	2784	2781	2764	2761
nega ive effec	240	239	264	261	240	243	260	263
Δ am ng TA n n-membe in %:								
mean	-8 4788	-10 4377	-12 8658	-14 2747	-8 5206	-10 5419	-13 0371	-14 3023
d dev.	11 0091	13 4688	16 1528	17 8867	10 9200	13 4392	16 1881	17 7507
min	-53 9526	-62 8453	-71 2951	-76 0053	-53 4747	-62 6759	-71 3592	-75 6461
max	13 5321	18 6218	21 9596	27 1705	11 6169	14 6234	17 9313	19 9144
# f TA n n-membe pai i h								
p i ive effec	648	637	585	576	566	560	511	513
nega ive effec	6224	6235	6287	6296	6256	6262	6311	6309

Notes:

X

X

X

X

Table 6b: un e fac ual e ul , he e gen u a iff a e

	ne-pa m del				T -pa m del			
	x gen u TA		nd gen u TA		x gen u TA		nd gen u TA	
	[[[,	N S	[[[,	N S	[[[,	N S	[[[,	N S
Ave age pe cen age inc ea e f ade fl								
f TA membe in exce f n n-membe	54 17	74 19	98 52	119 93	62 87	83 80	109 88	129 24
Δ am ng TA membe in %:								
mean	19 7942	27 0693	33 9699	41 6003	18 0771	24 9497	31 5141	37 9557
d dev.	20 9280	28 7512	37 1605	45 8032	19 3134	26 7589	34 7823	42 1189
min	-31 6092	-38 3996	-45 5465	-50 4034	-31 3305	-38 2633	-45 6025	-50 0361
max	87 9299	126 3383	171 8040	219 7474	79 8197	112 5929	153 5508	188 1116
# f TA membe pai i h								
p i ive effec	2726	2723	2710	2715	2777	2774	2761	2759
nega ive effec	248	251	264	259	247	250	263	265
Δ am ng TA n n-membe in %:								
mean	-8 5979	-10 5893	-13 0031	-14 4396	-8 6385	-10 6909	-13 1720	-14 4632
d dev.	11 1147	13 5771	16 2462	17 9829	11 0350	13 5559	16 2894	17 8548
min	-54 1725	-63 0465	-71 4552	-76 1490	-53 7025	-62 8824	-71 5227	-75 7942
max	13 3921	18 1760	21 5421	26 4472	11 0525	13 9861	17 2845	19 2018
# f TA n n-membe pai i h								
p i ive effec	637	624	574	576	561	550	500	510
nega ive effec	6235	6248	6298	6296	6261	6272	6322	6312

Notes:

X