

ADB-RETA 8782: Supporting Industrial Park Development In the CAREC Region

#### Diagnostic Studies of Free/Special Economic Zones in the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan: A Cautionary Tale

Michael Daly Consultant Asian Development Bank



# WHY A CAUTIONARY TALE?

"Anecdotal evidence suggests they [SEZs] fall into three broad categories: a few runaway successes, a larger number that come out marginally positive in cost-benefit assessments, and a long tail of failed zones that either never got going, were poorly run, or where investors gladly took tax breaks without producing substantial employment or export earnings." [The Economist, April 4, 2015.]

Similar conclusion in UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2018.

#### 1. PREVAILING VIEW OF SEZS•



<sup>3</sup>⁄<sub>4</sub> Throw light on whether FEZs/SEZs are cost-effective catalysts for <u>inclusive</u> growth (rather than enclaves).

3/4 Evaluate success of FEZs/SEZs in achieving their objectives.

<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> Suggest guidelines to improve zones' cost-effectiveness.

3/4 These guidelines reflect international rules & best practices.



## 3. CONCEPTs & METHODOLOGY

<sup>3</sup>⁄<sub>4</sub> TFP (and its proxies) key test of economic performance;

3/4 export- & FDI-orientation correlated with TFP & thus wages;

#### <sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> <u>facilitation</u> measures vs <u>incentives</u>;

<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> incentives justified only on grounds of "market failure";

3/4 essential but elusive concept of "incrementality";

<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> importance of transparency & policy evaluation.

## **ADB** 4. TAX PREFERENCES: KYRGYZSTAN

Type of tax	Inside FEZs	Outside FEZs
Import tariff	0%	6.9% <sup>1</sup>
Export tax	0%	various rates
VAT (standard rate)	0%	12%
Corporate income tax	0%	10%
Property tax	0%	0.8%
Land Tax	0%	various rates

<sup>1</sup> Simple average applied MFN tariff rate (2016).



<sup>3</sup><u>ADescription</u> of institutional framework and objectives;

3/<u>costs</u> of FEZs/SEZs (fiscal costs and efficiency losses);

3/2 conomic benefits (TFP, exports, FDI, etc.) of FEZs/SEZs;

<sup>3</sup>/<u>cost-effectiveness</u> in achieving objectives/benefits;


3/Suggest modifications (if not replacement) of FEZs/SEZs.

# 6. PERFORMANCE OF KYRGZ FEZS

- **9** FEZs' total production only 1.2% of GDP in 2016.
- **9** FEZs account for roughly 1% of total employment.
- 9 32% of Bishkek's FEZ production was exported in 2016.
- **9** FEZs' exports account for only 5.3% of total exports.
- 9 Investment in Bishkek FEZ rose to US\$6 million in 2016.
- 9 Average monthly wage is relatively low in Bishkek FEZ (Som 12,273 v Som14,479 in 2016).




#### Bishkek FEZ Exports as % of production





#### Bishkek FEZs' Shares, 2016



FEZ = free economic zones Source: \_\_\_\_\_



- 3/4 Only 3 SEZs have achieved their output, investment & jobs targets (the other 7 have yet to take off);
- 3/4 10 SEZs' shares of GDP, investment (FDI) and jobs negligible;
- 3/4 SEZs are oriented largely towards domestic market;
- 3/4 SEZs accounted for only 0.8% of total exports in 2016.
- 3/4 FDI accounted for only 8% of total investment in SEZs in 2015.
- 3/4 domestic market is insufficiently large to enable scale economies.

# ADB 8A. TENTATIVE GUIDELINES

1) Zones' <u>objectives</u> should be <u>clear</u> (with associated numerical targets) and <u>consistent</u> with the goal of improving TFP;

2) orient zones outward towards <u>exports</u> rather than the domestic market and facilitate inward <u>FDI</u> (& new technology);

3) monitor and evaluate cost-effectiveness of zones' features ;

4) evaluate <u>benefits/costs</u> of zones vs basic infrastructure;

5) zones' features should comply with <u>WTO/EAEU rules</u>;

# ADB 8B. TENTATIVE GUIDELINES

6) create linkages with local economy (not enclaves);

7) use measures to facilitate trade/investment, not incentives (which should be used only to correct "market failure");

8) BTAs should be the same for firms inside & outside zones;

9) abolish CIT holidays (on efficiency and fiscal grounds);

10) under WTO rules, in the case of goods, incentives should not be contingent upon exports or import substitution, or be "actionable";

### **8C. TENTATIVE GUIDELINES**

11) use short "<u>negative</u>" (not long "positive") lists of eligibility to permit a wide range of activities, including <u>services</u>;

12) "single-windows" should facilitate compliance with streamlined domestic regulations and procedures;

13) enhance <u>autonomy</u> and gt;"



## **8D. TENTATIVE GUIDELINES**

16) require high <u>environmental</u> as well as <u>labour standards</u>;

17) foster <u>centres of excellence</u> in collaboration with local firms, educational/training and research institutions; and

18) ensure TFP gains from trade liberalization, including the use of zones, and resulting economic growth are <u>inclusive</u>; and

19) <u>integrate</u> zones into national (and regional) EDS and ensure cross-border as well as domestic <u>co-ordination</u> among zones, various government bodies, and the private sector.



# 9. MAIN TAKEAWAYS

3/4 Most SEZs have failed, even in China

<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> China's successes are very difficult to replicate.

3/4 No convincing evidence of substantial "incrementality".

<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> Little, if any, evidence that zones substantially raise exports, attract FDI, & create highly-paid jobs.

<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> Guidelines should help improve performance.



### Thank you for your attention